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Abstract
The Air Force Installation Mission Support Center (AFIMSC) completed a Mission
Dependency Index (MDI) modernization in 2019 to support better risk-based decisionmaking by utilizing tactical mission-owner knowledge to quantify the relationship between
facilities and the missions they enable. The resulting facility-mission risk scores leave room
for improvement for better use of their intended purposes, due to (1) the vulnerability of
cognitive biases affecting survey responses due to the use of a traditional risk matrix, (2)
the lack of resolution between scores from risk ties, and (3) the failure to include
information from the operational and strategic organizational hierarchy level. This research
addresses these concerns through the novel implementation of a fuzzy logic system that
uses the existing assessment Interruptability and Replicability criteria. Fuzzy logic uses
expert knowledge and logical rules, where insufficient or imprecise data is present, to
produce meaningful results that are more precise and reliable than traditional risk matrices.
The Air Force, and other similarly motivated organizations, can use the proposed
framework to quantify a facility's MDI, prioritize projects, and authorize limited facility
sustainment, maintenance, and restoration resources.
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A FUZZY FRAMEWORK FOR THE AIR FORCE MISSION DEPENDENCY INDEX
I. Introduction
Background
Innovation in data collection and analysis techniques have improved facility managers'
opportunities to understand facility life-cycle costs and make data-driven decisions, which are
arguably more efficient than those based on decision-maker preferences. Facility managers can
use this data to optimize sustainment resources and extend facilities or real property asset
longevity. Executive Order 13327 mandated using identified best practices of asset management
for all Federal real property to increase efficiencies and improve economic return (White House
2004).

When developing operational risk management strategies, the Navy identified the need for an
objective process to compare and prioritize construction projects to mitigate consequences
associated with facility failure. This process needed to ensure that leadership prioritized resources
for facilities that support the Navy's most critical mission sets. The Navy researched the link
between facilities and the missions they enable to develop the Mission Dependency Index (MDI)
metric, which is used for decision support when prioritizing sustainment, restoration, and
maintenance projects (Antelman et al. 2008). MDI was a novel concept within the Department of
Defense. It was calculated through facility manager surveys using traditional risk matrices and
quantifying the facility's Intra-Dependency, Inter-Dependency, and the number of subcomponents
who depend on the facility for mission-critical support.
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The MDI methodology was validated and deployed for naval facilities. Grussing et al. (2010)
estimated that establishing a base's MDI values would cost between $40,000 and $75,000 and lead
to an annual data maintenance cost between $2.5M and $6.9M for the Air Force (Grussing et al.
2010; Nichols 2015). To avoid the initial and recurring costs associated with the Navy's model,
the Air Force modified the Navy's process to assign MDI based on asset type category codes
(CATCODE). This low-cost solution required less data collection and led the Air Force to develop
a simple, CATCODE-to-MDI model (Nichols 2015). The CATCODE is a six-digit identifier
classifying the facility type for the Federal government's Real Property Categorization System
(ASD 2020). Facility owners identified issues with the Air Force's CATCODE-to-MDI
methodology when mission-critical facilities had inaccurate scores because of their facility type,
rather than the importance to the mission they supported. When used to make decisions about
operational risk management strategies, these score mismatches lead to sub-optimal results.
Inaccuracies disproportionately affected some Air Force Major Command's (MAJCOM), like Air
Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) and Air Education and Training Command (AETC),
because of AFGSC's unique mission focus on nuclear deterrence and AETC's reliance on
traditionally less critical facilities such as classrooms, auditoriums and administrative offices
(Blaess 2017). These score mismatches occurred most frequently when the primary or active duty
mission of an installation was not aviation-focused (Smith 2016). These instances were widespread
and resulted in critical projects remaining unfunded and led to wasted resources for sub-optimal
assets (Blaess 2017).

To combat MDI score inaccuracy and disproportionality, the Air Force Civil Engineer Center
(AFCEC) provided guidance for installations to adjudicate facility MDI scores (AFCEC 2015).
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The adjudication process was complicated and required Air Force Civil Engineers at the base level
to justify all identified discrepancies and manage approval coordination between six levels of
authority. The additional human resources and management investments needed to assign a
facility's MDI score accurately highlighted a significant inefficiency with AFCEC's process and
further strained under-resourced base-level engineers (Smith 2016). Initially, AFCEC
implemented a re-normalization of adjudicated MDI scores to keep the desired 100-point range
for MDI. Eventually, the re-normalization process was abandoned and led to the MDI distribution
shifting, becoming left-skewed due to bases only adjudicating facility MDI when scores were too
low (Nichols 2015; Savatgy et al. 2019). Higher MDI scores were incentivized because a facility's
MDI contributed to the final technical project score used to compete for funding against other
sustainment, restoration, and maintenance facility projects. Because of these motivations, Air
Force's MDI values became inflated, and the range of possible scores decreased by one-third,
reducing the metric's decision-making value (Nichols 2015).

Researchers have conducted graduate-level research previously about the MDI. Nichols (2015)
investigated the history of the MDI and performed a Delphi Study with CE Senior Leaders to
determine how AFCEC can create a useable MDI metric that is not vulnerable to score inflation
over time. Next, Smith (2016) integrated MDI and machine learning with a Knowledge Discovery
in Database process to minimize the manual MDI adjudication efforts and better quantify the
relationship between facilities and the mission they support. Additionally, Blaess (2017)
investigated deviations between portfolios that used the CATCODE, NAVFAC, and adjudicated
MDI scores. Each study identified opportunities for the MDI to be more accurately quantified. The
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researchers also identified issues with the existing adjudication process and the need to review
scores to detect and prevent inflation periodically.

AFIMSC has recently modernized the Air Force's MDI metric to ensure installations can
accurately assign a facility's MDI with information about the mission it enables and the facility's
consequences of failure. This methodology represents a departure from the CATCODE-based
methods and uses operational risk management concepts within a traditional risk matrix (Figure
1). Like the Navy's MDI, the Air Force uses survey responses from mission owners to identify a
facility's Interruptability and Replicability to assign the MDI value. Interruptability gauges how
quickly a facility failure would impact the installation's mission. Replicability determines how
difficult it would be to relocate, replicate, or reconstitute the facility's mission-enabling
functionality (Savatgy et al. 2019). Unlike the Navy, the Air Force's MDI does not consider the
number of other missions dependent on the facility from within the installation level or across
different functional levels of the Air Force mission sets. Additionally, the traditional risk matrix
used does not incorporate operational or strategic level leadership opinions for a facility failure's
consequence to the mission or capture uncertainties between the risk matrix categories.
Furthermore, although a traditional risk matrix is easy to use and simple to produce, it is criticized
for its mathematical analysis errors and sub-optimal results, along with their vulnerability to
cognitive biases and subjective judgment (Cox 2008; Duijm 2015; International Electrotechnical
Commission 2019; Li et al. 2018; Smith et al. 2009).
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Figure 1. The tactical MDI risk matrix created by AFIMSC uses mission-owner responses of the
facility's Interruptability and Replicability to determine the MDI score (Savatgy et al. 2019).

Because AFIMSC completed the MDI re-baselining with a 4 × 4 categorical risk matrix, many
instances of score ties were produced (Figure 2). This result, which is a function of the limited
discrete outcomes from the matrix, does not enable leadership to analyze risks in rank order, as
facilities could only have 14 possible raw MDI scores. Over 45% of facilities had a "Prolonged"
Interruptability and "Possible" Replicability, which resulted in a raw score of MDI equal to 40. In
these instances, the MDI business rules triggered a re-ranking scheme based on two-digit facility
type codes. Base Civil Engineer Squadrons would determine a priority order of the facility codes,
which were then used by AFIMSC to assign these facilities scores below 40. This practice fails to
remedy the previously identified issues with a CATCODE-based MDI scoring process and reduces
the metric's decision-making value (Nichols 2015).
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Figure 2. The cumulative density of AFIMSC's MDI survey results with the raw matrix score
and the re-scored "Prolonged" and "Possible" classified facilities. This approach produces the
inconsistent "step" in the density function.

Problem Statement
The Air Force wants a simple, repeatable process to quantify the relationship between facilities
and the missions they enable. Though the second version of MDI is an upgrade over historical
versions, this new methodology leaves room for improvements. Currently, the MDI methodology
does not provide enough resolution to create meaningful prioritizations, is susceptible to cognitive
biases and human decision-making differences, and re-introduces the potential for score
mismatches and the adjudication issues identified using CATCODE-based MDIs. The system must
17

be improved to include information from all management hierarchy levels and consider human
decision-making differences to reduce bias. The system also needs to be easily adaptable to meet
the Air Force's changing needs without additional complexities. These upgrades will result in a
more accurate MDI methodology that the Air Force and similarly motivated organizations can use
to make better risk-based decisions, prioritize limited resources, and avoid wasted efforts.

Research Objectives
This research demonstrates Fuzzy Logic's use to link the relationship between Air Force facilities
and the missions they enable. This MDI metric can prioritize diverse project portfolios and help
base leadership understand its’ overall risk profile. To facilitate this objective, the author
developed three investigative questions to guide the research:

1. Is fuzzy logic an appropriate methodology for calculating MDI?
2. What is an appropriate framework for a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) that could enable
mission risk assessments?
3. How can fuzzy logic be used to expand MDI to enable participation by stakeholders from
all organizational hierarchy levels, e.g., operational and strategic level?

Methodology Overview
This research primarily focuses on using fuzzy logic as a methodology to determine MDI. It
expands the system boundaries to include information from the operational and strategic levels of
the Air Force. The use of value judgment and linguistics to categorize the likelihood and severity
of events during a risk assessment introduces uncertainty due to fuzziness. Translating this
18

uncertainty into fuzzy sets can allow users to solve problems where sharp boundaries may not exist
(Zadeh 1965). Fuzzy logic is essentially an expert knowledge-driven methodology comparable to
computing with words (Zadeh 1999). Human linguistics and analytical knowledge can conclude
without the use of mathematical numbers. For example, if you say:
IF Justin lives near Steven.
AND Steven lives near Chris.
You can answer the following question imprecisely: How far is Justin from Chris?
THEN, Chris lives not far from Justin.
When tolerance for imprecision can be exploited to achieve a result, computing with words can
provide a low cost, realistic result that is easy to understand and provides a satisfactory conclusion
(Zadeh 1999). Fuzzy logic and its beneficial substitution for traditional risk matrices have been
researched for military operational planning in the past and adequately address common problems
caused by knowledge uncertainties and linguistic inputs (Nelson 2019). Readers can learn more
about the fuzzy logic in the literature review seen in Chapter 2.

The framework proposed in this research follows the basic setup seen in Figure 3. Each fuzzy
system uses crisp inputs for a facility and fuzzifies them to a degree of truth within the system.
This fuzzy input is translated to a fuzzy output by set rules determined with expert knowledge.
This fuzzy output is then defuzzified with a determined inference methodology of defuzzification
to produce a crisp output used for decision support as described in Chapter 2.
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Figure 3. The basic fuzzy inference system (Figure 3a, top) and its role within the MDI
framework proposed (Figure 3b, bottom). Chapter 2's focus is the red text, and Chapter 3 is the
blue text sections of the framework.
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AFIMSC is the sponsor for this research and owns the new tactical MDI methodology and rebaselining data. The authors used the tactical MDI re-baselining data from 13 January 2020 to
simulate crisp input responses for the variables Interruptability and Replicability. These survey
response distributions allow the simulated results to remain realistic but unspecific to protect any
base or location's identities.

Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis follows the scholarly format. Chapters 2 and 3 serve as a stand-alone
journal publication. Chapter 2, "Prioritizing Facilities Linked to Corporate Strategic Objectives
Using a Fuzzy Logic Model," is a journal article submitted in January 2021 for publication in
Emerald Publishing's Journal of Facilities Management. This publication builds the fuzzy
inference system's foundation and integrates the existing AFIMSC tactical MDI matrix with fuzzy
logic. These FIS results were used to create an ordinal list of projects to compete for project
authorization and sustainment, maintenance, and restoration funding. A second journal article is
prepared for submission in Chapter 3, "A Fuzzy Inference-Based Facility Prioritization Decision
Support System for Complex Hierarchical Organizations," expands upon Chapter 2's foundation
to include operational and strategic level inputs to the FIS. This manuscript also includes a
sensitivity analysis to understand how risk attitude and cognitive biases in human decision-making
for subjective inputs can affect the system's overall results. Prediction bounds were used to
estimate expected outcomes and identify locations with extreme results. Sites with extreme results
can be re-evaluated to validate scores and to mitigate inflation of the MDI metric. The literature
review is dispersed between Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 focuses on reviewing fuzzy logic
applications with risk assessment and prioritization methodologies to determine if it is appropriate
21

to integrate with the MDI. Chapter 3 focuses its literature review on human decision-making and
fuzzy logic's application to hierarchical organizations. Finally, Chapter 4 summarizes the
research's limitations, conclusion, significance, and contributions, as well as recommended future
research areas.
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II. Prioritizing Facilities Linked to Corporate Strategic Objectives Using a Fuzzy Logic
Model
Devin DePalmer, Steven Schuldt, Justin Delorit
Abstract
A Mamdani fuzzy logic inference system is coupled with a traditional, categorical risk assessment
framework to understand a facilities' consequence of failure and its effect on an organization's
strategic objectives. Model performance is evaluated using the United States Air Force's facility
portfolio, which has been previously assessed, treating facility Replicability and Interruptability
as minimization objectives. The fuzzy logic inference system is built to account for these
objectives, but as proof of ease-of-adaptation, facility Dependency is added as an additional risk
assessment criterion. Limited facilities operating and modernization budgets require organizations
to carefully identify, prioritize, and authorize projects to ensure allocated resources align with
strategic objectives. Traditional facility prioritization methods using risk matrices can be improved
to increase granularity in categorization and avoid mathematical error or human cognitive biases.
These limitations restrict the utility of prioritizations, and if erroneously used to select projects for
funding, they can lead to wasted resources. This paper proposes a novel facility prioritization
methodology that corrects these assessment design and implementation issues. Results of the fuzzy
logic-based approach show a high degree of consistency with the traditional approach, though the
value of the information provided by the framework developed here is considerably higher, as it
creates a continuous set of facility prioritizations that are unbiased. The fuzzy logic framework is
likely suitable for implementation by diverse, spatially distributed organizations in which decisionmakers seek to balance risk assessment complexity with output value.
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Introduction
Portfolio and project management within facilities management departments are an important and
complicated issue in the private and public sectors. Prioritization requires that companies identify,
prioritize, and authorize projects that align with organizational objectives (Filho et al. 2018;
Hannach et al. 2016). Large, geographically distributed organizations may require projects from
subordinate locations or work centers to compete for centralized funding. Limited resources drive
organizations to prioritize projects with the understanding that not all candidate projects submitted
by subordinate locations will be selected for funding. Companies must, therefore, establish a
standardized basis for comparing facilities to determine how each affects corporate objectives. The
net effect of developing a prioritization framework has two beneficial outcomes. First, it ensures
organizations can fund the right project at the right time and avoid funding a project for a facility
when other facilities and projects could be more critical for satisfying strategic objectives. Second,
it provides organizations with a translation of objectives to facilities, enabling the development of
facility and organizational risk profiles. Each of these outcomes results in enhanced fiscal resource
utilization and minimizes organization risk and decision-maker regret. However, a valuable
methodology for prioritization should seek meaningful, robust results as simply as possible;
decision-makers prefer this approach (Karlsson et al. 2006).

In general, project prioritization methodologies are organization specific. However, they should
emanate from a generalized methodological approach to ensure prioritization outputs are valid and
can be post-processed to meet decision-maker use requirements. Three main steps exist for
methodological prioritization: (1) identification of factors affecting decision making, (2) valuation
of identified factors, and (3) ranking of projects (Akgun et al. 2010; Andres et al. 2016; Bowles
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and Peláez 1995; Bozbura and Beskese 2007; Jamshidi et al. 2013; Markowski and Mannan 2008;
Moazami et al. 2011; Shaygan and Testik 2019). Factors for prioritization should be identified that
align with the organization's strategic objectives (Hannach et al. 2016), and the risk assessment
performed should reflect how the loss of an asset places risk on these objectives.

Facilities are an "enabler" for work processes that support organizational goals or productivity and
link the facilities to the organization's objectives (National Research Council 2004). There is a
literature gap concerning prioritization methods that link facilities to strategic organizational
objectives, particularly within non-profit-seeking organizations. Akgun et al. (2010) conducted a
highly stylized and single objective vulnerability assessment for a small municipal airport.
Educational campuses, like Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), have used analytical
hierarchy process (AHP) and multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) to prioritize facility renewal
projects that align with identified impact categories, e.g., impact on health safety and the
environment, economic impacts, and coordination with policies, programs, and operations
(Karydas and Gifun 2006). This process allowed MIT's facilities managers to align projects with
strategic objectives by understanding the consequence of not funding a project.

Three significant limitations emerge from both the Akgun et al. and Karydas and Gifun analyses:
1) they are applied to a single location, with a limited set of organizational objectives; 2) the
methods of risk assessment require extensive amounts of data and deliberation to categorize the
desired performance metrics, and 3) the methods do not make use of generalized approaches to
risk. The DoD and NASA created the Mission Dependency Index (MDI) to link facilities to their
organization's objectives (Antelman et al. 2008; Antelman and Miller 2002). This methodology
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can be applied to diverse locations. It does not require extensive amounts of data or training for
decision-makers, and the metric score produced is used to stratify and authorize facility projects.
Antelman's research is the only large-scale application of this type of requirement; however, the
mathematical transformation of ordinal results to calculate the MDI score leaves room for
improvement to reduce errors, bias, and uncertainty (Kujawski and Miller 2009). This paper's
research intends to integrate the Air Force's MDI methodology with fuzzy logic so that facilities
can be linked to strategic objectives, and facility projects can be funded in an order that best
supports the organization.

Facility Risk Management
Risk assessments require decision-makers to think strategically and to problem solve when
comparing alternatives (Hertz and Thomas, 1982). Hertz and Thomas (1982) conclude risk
assessments are "useful for understanding, formulating and resolving ill-structured, complex
policy and planning problems." Private companies typically focus their risk assessments on
identifying projects that maximize revenues using cost-benefit analysis (Hannach et al. 2016;
National Research Council 2004). Although profits and losses may be a common metric of
consequence for some private-sector organizations, organizational objectives cannot be measured
monetarily for many public and private entities, e.g., education, healthcare, corporate, or
government agencies (National Research Council 2004). Instead, these types of corporations often
measure their utility through risk mitigation. Faber and Stewart (2003) defined risk as "the
expected consequences associated with a given activity." Risk cannot be measured in nature and
instead is a priori, and calculated by formulas of probability and consequence, most simply as the
product of the two.
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One way to establish a standard comparison for risk mitigation-oriented organizations is to
measure facility failure by estimating the organization's consequence from reduced productivity.
Estimating the consequence of failure is made difficult by the complex nature of comparing direct
losses (building damage, production loss), indirect losses (inconvenience to users, unemployment,
social perceptions, cascading failures), and non-monetary losses such as loss of life, injury to
employees, environmental damage, or community disruption (Faber and Stewart 2003; Karydas
and Gifun 2006; National Research Council 2004). Identifying and quantifying these losses can
help portfolio managers mitigate the risks associated with facility failure.

Markowski and Mannan (2008) suggest that there are qualitative, quantitative, and semiquantitative approaches to constructing risk assessment methodologies. Organizations must select
the approach that provides the level of risk detail desired for decision making. Qualitative methods
use only categorical values, such as low, medium, and high, to assign risk likelihood or severity
levels. Qualitative methods are preferred for their simplicity and can be used when quantitative
data is unavailable or inadequate, or under budget or time constraints (Radu 2009). Unfortunately,
qualitative assessments frequently do not provide numerically robust outputs that enable advanced
decision making, do not capture uncertainty at the edges of each category, and only produce
relative measures of risk. Quantitative categorization gives numerical intervals to well-defined
categories, such as "likely to interrupt operations," which might correspond to an interval of
unfavorable events with a probability of [0.25, 0.4]. Similarly, a category of severity indicating
"very high risk to operations" could result in economic losses between $4 and $5 million. These
objective categories can be used to repeatably calculate precise risk assessments, but can be time

27

or budget consuming due to the requirement for accurate and available data, and require that
organizations can quantify risk categories (Radu 2009). Semi-quantitative methods use categorical
values, which may either added or multiplied to create a risk score. The categorical value on the
matrix will indicate more severity or risk probability by assigning higher values, which increases
the output risk score (Markowski and Mannan 2008). Semi-quantitative assessments have many
of the same advantages as qualitative risk assessments in terms of ease of implementation, though
these methods have the added bonus of creating an ordinal list of results that can be used for better
prioritization (Radu 2009). Semi-quantitative results are not preferred when prioritization must
occur through objective measures, like cost-benefit-analysis, but are less time and data-intensive
than quantitative methods. In general, semi-quantitative approaches represent an attractive blend
of qualitative and quantitative assessments and may be preferred by organizations seeking to
minimize time spent thinking about facilities while still achieving a robust prioritization that will
ensure limited budgets are applied to the most critical facilities.

Risk matrices commonly use the basic properties of likelihood and severity, or variations such as
probability and consequence of an event, to prioritize risks or aid in decision-making about
accepting risk (Duijm 2015; International Electrotechnical Commission 2019). Despite their
popularity, risk matrices are criticized for their design and mathematical analyses of risk (Cox
2008; Duijm 2015; International Electrotechnical Commission 2019; Li et al. 2018; Nelson 2019;
Smith et al. 2009). Because of their relatively simple design, matrices are subject to decisionmaker cognitive biases and subjectivity (International Electrotechnical Commission 2019).
Hubbard and Evans (2010) reveal bias and subjectivity arise from individual experiences,
optimism bias, confirmation bias, variability in understanding verbal descriptions, and subjective
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assessment, among many nurtured and natural traits. Smith et al. (2009) goes on to document
centering bias and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992)
and their effects on risk matrix results. Subjective probability causes individuals to overestimate
small probabilities and underestimate large probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Personal
ownership causes individuals who have more attachment to the asset (i.e., managers or facility
owners) to overestimate the severity of consequences (Smith et al. 2009).

Qualitative and semi-quantitative categories, commonly seen in risk matrices, are primarily based
on user experience and can result in subjective judgments rather than quantitative standards.
Subjective judgment is when different survey participants assign the same situation to different
risk categories (International Electrotechnical Commission 2019). Traditional risk matrices are not
recommended for complex risk assessments because of the limitations associated with these
methodologies (Cox 2008; Duijm 2015; International Electrotechnical Commission 2019; Nelson
2019; Smith et al. 2009). Though matrices may still underly a risk assessment process, they should
be designed or hidden to eliminate bias and subjectivity concerns.

Large, multi-location and multi-objective organizations like the Department of Defense (DoD) and
NASA have prioritized large project portfolios using traditional risk-based metrics to link facilities
to strategic organizational objectives (Amekudzi and McNeil 2008). Each has chosen to implement
semi-quantitative traditional risk matrices with discrete categories as a means of simplifying the
complexity of consistently evaluating a large number of facilities across multiple operating
locations with unique missions (Antelman and Miller 2002; Grussing et al. 2010; Savatgy et al.
2019). Semi-quantitative risk matrices produce ordinal numbers, which the DoD and NASA have
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arithmetically transformed to understand vulnerable facilities on their campuses and prioritize
facility projects at multiple organizational levels (Amekudzi and McNeil 2008; Kujawski and
Miller 2009). However, semi-quantitative ordinal outputs cannot be translated using parametric
mathematical operations. Therefore, transformed consequence outputs for any subsequent use,
e.g., prioritizations, are inaccurate. Furthermore, the discrete categories and verbal linguistics used
to prioritize these facilities introduce uncertainty due to fuzziness, leading to missed opportunities
and wasted resources.

Fuzzy Logic and Risk Management
Fuzzy logic can be used with semi-quantitative risk assessments to produce discrete ordinal outputs
that can be used for prioritization (Akgun et al. 2010; Markowski and Mannan 2008; Moazami et
al. 2011). Furthermore, this methodology also removes the confirmation bias associated with using
a traditional risk matrix by obscuring the decision makers' view (Duijm 2015; Hubbard and Evans
2010). Fuzzy logic and fuzzy sets may also be utilized when uncertainty due to fuzziness exists,
such as between categories in a traditional risk matrix (Duijm 2015; Markowski and Mannan
2008). The advantages of maximizing value for decision-makers while minimizing complexity
make fuzzy logic an ideal choice for integration with risk assessments.

Fuzzy logic is one of the only methodologies that enable decision-makers to compute with words
(Zadeh 1999). Prioritization and risk assessment methodologies commonly use verbal linguistics
to organize or categorize requirements making fuzzy logic a complementary synthesis. Analytical
hierarchy process (AHP), a common technique used by decision-makers for analysis of
alternatives, has been integrated with fuzzy logic to prioritize human capital measurement
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indicators (Bozbura and Beskese 2007), pavement rehabilitation and maintenance projects
(Moazami et al. 2011), and generalized project prioritization and selection (Shaygan and Testik
2019). Fuzzy logic has been blended with failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA)
since FMECA typically uses imprecise information and verbal linguistics to assess criticality
(Bowles and Peláez 1995). Fuzzy sets have been used to prioritize safety issues by developing a
fuzzy risk matrix and were discovered to be more precise and reliable than traditional risk matrices
(Markowski and Mannan 2008). Vulnerability assessments have used fuzzy logic to study facility
risk against terrorist attacks, which specifically considered interdependencies among facilities for
small-scale airports (Akgun et al. 2010). Fuzzy logic has been integrated with existing pipeline
risk assessment methodologies to create a more precise and more robust model for controlling
risks associated with pipelines (Jamshidi et al. 2013). An advantage of using fuzzy logic inference
systems is that the system can be easily manipulated to add additional components without
additional complexities to the modeler or decision-makers.

Facilities Risk Management and Fuzzy Logic
Despite the significant contributions of the aforementioned literature, no formalized prioritization
method exists that links an organization's strategic objectives to its built assets. Decision-makers
need a simple solution that limits data collection and deliberation time while providing actionable
outputs without the use of a risk matrix.

In

this paper, a semi-quantitative risk assessment

methodology used by the United States Air force to determine the consequence of failure for
facilities, and as a component of capital improvement project prioritization, is adapted with a fuzzy
logic inference system to improve the fidelity and granularity of facility prioritization process. The
existing risk methodology used by the Air Force, which possesses many of the same risk-matrix
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design and implementation flaws discussed above, is described in Section 2. A semi-quantitative
method is used because of the ordinal nature of events and the desire for a simple, repeatable
process that can be applied to large, diverse organizations with hierarchical structures (Antelman
and Miller 2002; National Research Council 2004). Fuzzy logic has been widely used in asset and
organizational prioritization methodologies (Akgun et al. 2010; Jamshidi et al. 2013; Markowski
and Mannan 2008; Moazami et al. 2011), but this is the first application where it has been used for
large-scale, diverse organizations with hierarchical structures to link facilities to an organization's
strategic objectives. The flexible nature of fuzzy logic systems allows modelers to add components
without adding complexity, making it a superior choice for integration with the Air Force's project
prioritization method and consequence of failure calculations (Nelson 2019).

Background Data and Methodology: Linking United States Air Force Objectives to Project
and Facility Prioritization
Diverse, spatially distributed organizations are plentiful and form the backbone of many industries.
The United States Department of Defense (DoD) is one of the world's largest industrial complexes.
Like many U.S. government agencies, which possess many of the same risk matrix design and
implementation flaws discussed above, the DoD developed the Mission Dependency Index (MDI)
as the risk-based metric to link facilities to an organization's strategic objectives (Antelman et al.
2008; Antelman and Miller 2002). While each military service within the DoD uses a different
methodology to calculate MDI, each version of MDI is calculated using some combination of
Interruptability, Replicability, and Dependency as surrogates for organizational objectives
(Antelman and Miller 2002; Nichols 2015). The Air Force Installation Mission Support Center
(AFIMSC) focused its MDI on the tactical, or installation, level. AFIMSC implemented the
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Tactical Mission Dependency Index (TMDI) to link local facilities or assets to local operational
objectives in order to support risk-based decision making and provide leadership a risk profile
view of their campus (Weniger 2020). The survey results categorized 54,000 facilities at 79
campus locations across the globe. TMDI was calculated with a traditional risk matrix (Figure 4)
and used the following Replicability and Interruptability survey questions to elicit facility-byfacility responses from mission owners:
1) Interruptability: How fast would the campus's mission capabilities be impacted if the
functional capabilities in building #were interrupted? (Assumes complete unavailability
due to long term deferred maintenance).
2) Replicability: How difficult would it be for the campus to relocate or replicate functional
capabilities if this facility's operations were interrupted? (Non-fixed equipment could be
moved).

Figure 4. Traditional TMDI Risk Matrix (Savatgy et al. 2019)
Mission owners and facility occupants answered the survey questions to determine the risk of
facility loss on strategic objectives (Savatgy et al. 2019). The traditional risk matrix implemented
by the Air Force for the TMDI framework is problematic because it only allows for 14 unique
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outcomes due to risk ties and discrete categories usage. These outcomes and ties can be seen by
the large "stairs" or "step" results above TMDI = 40 in a cumulative density plot of the Air Force's
facility portfolio (Figure 5). Assets that received a TMDI score less than 40 were automatically
reassigned a score less than or equal to 40, based on the significant administrative function housed
in the facility. This rescoring process affected nearly 45% of the Air Force's portfolio. It was
mostly undertaken to quickly score assets that are unlikely to compete well for funds against those
facilities with higher TMDI scores. However, rescoring in this way does not link specific facilities
to strategic objectives. Instead, the rescoring linearly distributes scores based on facility type. By
increasing the range of categories, portfolio managers and campus leadership can accurately
capture campus risk profiles and prioritize projects by the organization's strategic objectives.
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Figure 5. Cumulative density of AFIMSC's TMDI original survey results. Note, facilities with
scores greater than 40 retain a matrix-based score. Those facilities receiving a matrix score of 40
are rescored. This approach produces the inconsistent "step" in the density function.
Furthermore, risk ties force prioritizations to be determined by the facility's probability of failure
and do not provide campus leadership an accurate representation of their campus's risk profile.
Another limitation of the current methodology is that Dependency was not used as a variable to
determine consequences. Omitting Dependency is problematic when similar facility types exist at
different campuses when multiple facilities with varying usage levels on a single campus are
compared, or when a failure in one facility creates failure in others. Dependency should be
evaluated to ensure cascading effects are considered when determining the consequence of failure.
The coloring of the matrix in Figure 4 makes risk tolerance levels impossible to discern and adds
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no value to the matrix due to its equivalence with a risk score. The linguistic variables used to
categorize facilities invite subjective judgment from all survey participants, and the fuzzy identity
between categories is not captured within the matrix.

While TMDI is used primarily in the creation of installation and service-level risk profiles, Air
Force civil engineers at each of the Air Force's 89 installations use a unique project scoring
methodology to create an annual Integrated Priority List (IPL) of candidate facility improvement
projects that compete for funding distributed by the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC)
(DoD 2017). The IPL is a list of projects prioritized by a technical score, which indicates a level
of risk to the organization if the project goes unfunded. A project's technical score is calculated
using TMDI. Because the Air Force's methodology to calculate TMDI is laden with substantive
deficiencies in design and execution, project funding decisions are likely suboptimal.

The subjective probability introduced by mission owners and facility occupants when answering
TMDI questions adds bias to the results from their perceptions or personal ownership (Hubbard
and Evans 2010; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Smith et al. 2009). This bias affects the accuracy
and utility of TMDI, which manifests itself in both risk profiles and project outcomes. While
literature shows general risk assessment design and implementation issues are pervasive across
organizations, the authors suspect these issues extend to facilities prioritization. This study
provides a path forward, illustrating an adaptation methodology that integrates a fuzzy logic
inference system for bias-reduced facilities prioritization. While the methodology is calibrated to
the Air Force, any organization that can define its objectives can benefit from a fuzzy logic-based
approach.
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Methodology: Fuzzy Logic for Facility Risk Assessment

Zadeh (1965) proposed classes of objects called fuzzy sets with "continuous grades of
membership." Natural human linguistics is frequently used to describe fuzzy sets (Zadeh 1965). A
fuzzy logic system takes a crisp input value from a decision-maker and fuzzifies it into a fuzzy
input set (Figure 6). This facilities prioritization problem translates crisp inputs for Interruptability,
Replicability, and Dependency to fuzzy inputs. The fuzzy input sets become a fuzzy output set
based on a set of rules, which are discussed below. The fuzzy outputs from the inference system
are defuzzified through weightings and averages of the outputs from all the rules, and a
deterministic, crisp output is calculated.

Figure 6. Generalized fuzzy inference system adapted from Larguech et al. 2015
A fuzzy inference system can provide additional information with similar utility and meaningful
results using less time and resources for analysis (Mitchell and Carter III 1993). Verbal linguistics'
popularity provides fuzzy logic a seamless integration with established risk analysis methods,
reducing bias, and capturing additional dimensionality. Although the initial system must be
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constructed, the outputs are more valuable for decision-makers. They can easily be used to link
facilities to organizational objectives for the allocation of prioritized resources.

The fuzzy logic integration framework proposed here is adapted to the TMDI risk assessment and
follows a four-step process: (1) membership functions are created to enable continuous input for
Interruptability, Replicability, and Dependency; (2) membership functions are developed for
outputs to calculate the Consequence of Failure, which produces a TMDI score; (3) rules for the
risk-based-matrix and fuzzy system are established; (4) outputs are evaluated graphically to ensure
the prioritization of facilities is consistent with decision maker priorities.

Step 1. Establish membership functions for inputs
The fuzzy logic system used Interruptability, Replicability, and Dependency as input categories.
The TMDI survey established by AFIMSC previously defined Interruptability and Replicability,
but Dependency was added to reflect the best practices identified by NASA, the DoD, and focused
mission Dependency index Delphi studies (Antelman and Miller 2002; Nichols 2015).
Dependency is defined here by the number of facilities, expressed as a percent of total operations
on campus, that depend on the operation of the facility in question. Dependency was divided into
three levels of high, medium, and low. Clearly, Dependency can be redefined by an organization,
and it is kept purposefully simple here to maintain the interpretability of results.

To overcome the rescoring requirement for facilities rated at TMDI = 40, and to achieve an output
range of 0 to 100 for congruence with the Air Force's project scoring model, additional categories
of likelihood and severity were added to the Air Force's basic matrix. Though this increases the
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matrix's size, it adds little in the way of complexity for the decision-maker, as the matrix is not
revealed. As mentioned above, the membership functions for inputs were determined to be
triangular and trapezoidal. Replicability and Interruptability membership functions were set to
have equal boundary size with the range of all crisp input values set from [0, 6]. The range was
determined by aligning each category's peak such that equal spacing is achieved between each of
the positive integers starting at 1. Dependency was divided into three trapezoidal membership
functions and had a range of [0, 1]. The range for Dependency was set with the intent that there
was a maximum value of 100 and a minimum value of 0. This range was set to indicate the
percentage of other facilities on an installation that relied on the operations within a facility. The
membership function limits for low, medium, and high were determined with realism and
practicality in mind. Fuzzy degrees of truth had equal rates of change between Low - Medium and
Medium - High Dependency levels. Input fuzzy set ranges and linguistic terms are summarized in
Table 1. These membership function ranges and limits can be easily calibrated to match an
organization's leadership or decision-maker opinions, and they allow the establishment of a clearly
defined evaluation process with common terminology (National Research Council 2004). The
cumulative effect reduces bias while maximizing the use of risk assessment best practices
described in the previous sections.

Step 2. Establish membership functions for outputs
The fuzzy logic system used the consequence of failure as the output category. The output category
was divided into five membership functions to match the commonly classified MDI risk categories
established by the Navy and Army (Amekudzi and McNeil 2008; Grussing et al. 2010). The risk
levels determined each category's boundaries, and the range of values was set from [0,100] to
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match the existing TMDI score range. Triangular membership functions were used to simplify the
model and for their effectiveness representing uncertainty between categories. All membership
functions were equally spaced from 0 to 100 and can be calibrated to fit leadership and decisionmaker opinions. Table 1 displays the output fuzzy set ranges and established terms.
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Table 1. Fuzzy Sets for Fuzzy Risk Matrix
Linguistic
Variable

Linguistic Terms
(Fuzzy Set)

Description range

Universe of
Discourse

Replicability
(Likelihood)
L

I: Impossible
II: Extremely Difficult
III: Difficult
IV: Possible:
V: Available

(4 < I ≤ 6)
(3 < II < 5)
(2 < III ≤ 4)
(1 < IV ≤ 3)
(0 ≤ V ≤ 2)

.! ∈ (0,6)

Interruptability
(Severity)
S

A: Immediate
B: Brief
C: Short
D: Prolonged
E: No Impact

(4 < A ≤ 6)
(3 < B < 5)
(2 < C ≤ 4)
(1 < D ≤ 3)
(0 ≤ E ≤ 2)

." ∈ (0,6)

Dependency
D

Low
Medium
High

(0 ≤ D ≤ 0.4)
(0.2 ≤ D ≤ 0.8)
(0.6 ≤ D ≤ 1)

.# ∈ (0,1)

Consequence
of Failure
C

VH: Very High
H: High
M: Medium
L: Low
VL: Very Low

(75 < VH ≤ 100)
(50 < H < 100)
(25 < M ≤ 75)
(0 < L ≤ 50)
(−25 ≤ VL ≤ 25)

.$ ∈ (0,100)
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Membership Function

Step 3. Establish rules for the fuzzy system
The fuzzy inference system maps fuzzified Interruptability, Replicability, and Dependency inputs
to outputs to create a crisp TMDI result. The rules established for the inference system determine
the actions of the system and are presented simply:

!" $! %& '"! ()* $# %& '"# ()* … $$ %& '"$ ,-./ 0 %& 1" (345 % = 1,2,3 … ;)

(1)

Where $" is the input variable; '"$ and 1" are linguistic terms; 0 is the output variable; and ; is
the number of rules. This structure is simple compared to other approaches, and it simulates the
complexity of human decision making (Lee 1990).

Rules for the fuzzy logic system were determined based on the risk levels (Figure 7). Seventy-five
Boolean-logic rules were created that correspond to all the possible outcomes of Dependency,
likelihood, and severity within the fuzzy system. Risk scores were created based on the semiquantitative methodology similar to the original TMDI matrix (Figure 4). Since the categories were
determined to follow a logarithmic scale of classification, addition was used to combine the risk
scores, which was a best practice identified by Duijm (2015). A Medium Dependency matrix was
created first. This matrix is intended to most closely represent the original TMDI matrix and
provides a point-of-departure for High and Low Dependency simulations. Beyond adding an extra
category for Interruptability and Replicability, as discussed above, the score differences between
each category were adjusted to achieve an even categorical distribution, which is consistent with
the original TMDI matrix. In the original TMDI matrix, Interruptability and Replicability scores
had a gradient of twelve and eight, respectively (Figure 4). The matrix proposed here is updated
such that Replicability has a gradient of ten to avoid risk ties and expand the scores range. Rules
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were determined by the prevailing membership function of the resulting score. The Low
Dependency rules were created by subtracting six from both Interruptability and Replicability
category values for medium Dependency. The High Dependency rules were created by adding six
to both the Interruptability and Replicability values for Medium Dependency. The addition and
subtraction presented here is arbitrary but is provided as an illustration of the ease with which
additional dimensionality can be added to risk assessments through fuzzy logic and the degree to
which TMDI scores are sensitive to a range of Dependency assumptions.

Figure 7. Dependency levels (top row) and corresponding fuzzy rules (bottom row)
Fuzzy inference requires a database of all possible linguistic control outcomes for the fuzzy
system. Mamdani fuzzy models are the most widely used inference method in risk assessments
(Jamshidi et al. 2013; Markowski and Mannan 2008). A Mamdani inference system uses each
membership function combination triggered by crisp inputs to map the minimum degree of
freedom to the output rule membership function. The Mamdani model applies the minimum
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operator for the "AND" method and the maximum operator for the "OR" method of rules. The
fuzzy output set was aggregated for each rule. The final step was the defuzzification of the result,
which was calculated using the centroid method to produce a crisp consequence value. There are
many defuzzification methods, and the most popular approach uses centroid defuzzification, which
returns the center of gravity of the fuzzy set along the x-axis (Equation 2).

$=

∑! &((! )(!
∑! &((! )

(2)

Where >($" ) is the degree of truth for point $" on the universe of discourse ?. The advantage of
using the centroid method is that all activated rules contribute to the defuzzification process
(Jamshidi et al. 2013). The centroid method of defuzzification is used in this methodology due to
its simplicity and widespread use for prioritization methods (Akgun et al. 2010; Jamshidi et al.
2013; Moazami et al. 2011)

The final fuzzy risk surface is produced to show the difference in consequence (TMDI) as
Dependency, Interruptability, and Replicability change (Figure 8). The different Dependency
levels allow for further understanding of consequence and better prioritization when the success
or failure of facilities are linked.
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Figure 8. Fuzzy risk surfaces
Step 4. Evaluate outputs graphically
The crisp inputs used for the fuzzy logic system were simulated using the original TMDI survey
responses. A Gaussian distribution was used to approximate responses from survey takers and
translate the discrete traditional risk matrix into the continuous, crisp input responses required for
the fuzzy inference system (Smith et al. 2009). Crisp inputs for the categories of "Immediate,"
"Brief," "Short," "Impossible," "Extremely Difficult," and "Difficult," used the maximum degree
of membership for each membership function as value >. The average value > was shifted down
by 0.2 to simulate crisp inputs for "Prolonged" and "Possible" responses. It was assumed that
survey responders would have to pick between the "Prolonged – No Impact" and "Possible –
Available" answer combinations, but that the responses would be skewed towards "Prolonged"
and "Possible." This assumption reflects the likelihood that most assets are realistically unlikely
to have "No Impact" or be immediately available for use. A standard deviation was determined, so
less than 1% of the Gaussian-shaped, simulated crisp inputs would fall outside the selected survey
category's membership function. For example, a survey taker who classified a facility to have
"Possible" Replicability should have a crisp input value less than 2.5 or "Extremely Difficult"
Replicability to have a crisp value within [3.5, 4.5]. Dependency was assumed to be higher at the
campus (tactical) level due to similar geographic location and the intentional independent
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operations of each campus location. Dependency was modeled using a Pearson distribution to
translate the skew of the results (Table 2). These input parameters only show the additional
dimensionality of the proposed methodology. The crisp inputs were translated into outputs using
the fuzzy inference system, and the resulting cumulative distribution of the fuzzy inference
system's outputs of consequence is shown in Figure 9.
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Table 2. Simulated response distribution parameters
Interruptability
Immediate
Brief
Short
Prolonged

!
5
4
3
1.75

"
0.167
0.167
0.167
0.25

Impossible
Extremely Difficult
Difficult
Possible

!
5
4
3
1.75

"
0.167
0.167
0.167
0.25

"
0.167

kurtosis
3

skew
-0.75

Replicability

Dependency
!
1
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Results and Discussion
The resulting consequence of failure scores in Figure 9 are more continuous than the
previously seen "Steps" in Figure 5. The distribution of results allows campus leadership
to effectively prioritize facilities due to fewer risk ties and ensures the funding limit falls
between clear distinctions in facilities consequence of failure scores. That is, decisionmakers will now be able to distinguish between facilities close to the funding boundaries
or create 1-! facility priority lists. The TMDI consequence scores from the fuzzy logic
system are slightly higher than AFIMSC's results due to the Dependency metric's addition
and the assumption that Dependency is higher at the local campus level. Still, the
consistency between the original and modeled TMDI results suggests that the framework
produces useful results that do not materially change the output but add dimensionality
without increasing the decision maker's complexity. These similar results ensure a simple
and repeatable process can be implemented to determine the consequence of failure that
links facilities to the organization's strategic objectives.
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Figure 9. Cumulative distribution waterfall of fuzzy results plotted with the original
AFIMSC TMDI scores.

A review of fictional facilities reveals the value of the proposed framework at the facilityscale. Ten fictional example facilities were examined with the fuzzy logic inference
system. The use of Dependency was identified as a necessary variable to determine TMDI.
The need for Dependency is made clear by comparing scenarios A and B, which detail
different campus Child Care Centers (Nichols 2015). Each example facility may support
the needs of the larger organization similarly. Still, scenario A should have a higher
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consequence of failure since over 60% of other campus operations depend on its services.
This difference in score reflects lower availability or quality of childcare resources in the
local economy, which drives users and the campus's mission to rely on uninterrupted
childcare. Facilities that previously existed on the edges of the same category, such as those
possessing an Interruptability of one day or six days, are both considered "Short." These
were previously indistinguishable using the traditional risk matrix (Figure 4). Including the
fuzzy logic framework clarifies scenarios A and C, which were previously treated as
identical due to the Air Force TMDI matrix's categorical nature, and are now accurately
distinguished within the membership functions. Utilizing Dependency also allows facilities
to be accurately prioritized in extreme situations such as scenario F. This special use facility
would have previously had the highest score using the traditional risk matrix but can now
be accurately prioritized against similarly vulnerable and specialized operations. Even
though the change (TMDI = 100 becomes 96.7), it provides the distinguishment necessary
to make difficult funding or emergency response decisions. Dependency also enables
positive TMDI change, specifically for facilities that may be identified as having lower
Replicability or Interruptability. Such is the case for scenario H, which receives a higher
prioritization post-fuzzy logic due to the inclusion of cascading failure in other facilities.
Clearly, if a hospital becomes inoperable other facilities are affected, like fire stations and
facilities
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Table 3. Example Scenarios Fuzzy vs. Traditional Methodology
Example Scenarios
Inputs

Output

Traditional

Fuzzy

L

S

D

L

S

D

Priority

Traditional

Fuzzy

Risk Level

Traditional

Fuzzy

A

Child Care Center

Brief

Difficult

Medium

3.8

3.2

0.62

72

72.3

High-Medium

3

5

B

Child Care Center

Brief

Difficult

Low

3.8

3.2

0.2

72

56

Medium-High

3

8

C

Family Housing Center

Brief

Difficult

Medium

3.1

3.8

0.62

72

69

High - Medium

3

6

D

Flight Simulator

Short

Impossible

Medium

3.8

4.8

0.62

76

94

High - Medium

4

3

E

Passenger Terminal

Immediate

Possible

Low

4.5

3.55

0.2

76

63.1

High - Medium

4

7

F

Special Use Facility

Immediate

Impossible

Low

5

4.9

0.1

100

96.7

Very High- High

1

2

G

Religious facility

Short

Ex. Difficult

Medium

3.8

3.2

0.62

68

72.3

High-Medium

5

5

H

Hospital

Immediate

Ex. Difficult

High

5.5

4

0.85

92

100

Very High

2

1

I

Heritage Monument

No Impact

Impossible

High

1

5.3

0.8

40

75

High

6

4

J

Secondary Runway

Short

Available

Low

3.8

1

0.15

40

25

Very Low- Low

6

9
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Score ties are seen in the traditional TMDI methodology for assets classified like scenario D;
"Short" and "Impossible," or scenario E; "Immediate" and "Possible." These score ties make
prioritization impossible and may result in wasted efforts and resources by portfolio managers.
Using crisp inputs for Interruptability, Replicability, and Dependency reduces risk ties, and
organizations can more accurately and more precisely prioritize their facilities based on their
strategic objectives. When score ties do appear, such as scenario A and scenario G, it can be
determined that there is no subjectivity due to the linguistic or discrete categories, and the risk
associated with funding one or the other is equal.

The requirement to prioritize facility types for assets with a TMDI less than 40 was an additional
step implemented by the Air Force that did not link the specific facility with the organization's
strategic objectives. Instead, the original methodology tied the facility type with the organization's
strategic goals. Over 45% of the Air Force's facilities were initially scored below 40. Due to the
limited resolution, both scenarios I and scenario J earned the same score of 40 and would need to
be rescored when using the traditional risk matrix. Risk ties lead to inaccurate prioritization levels
when two of the same facility types have different impacts on the organization's strategic
objectives. A heritage monument (scenario I) may be seemingly unimportant to an organization's
goals by its operations; however, when over 80% of the other organizations on campus use this
location for events or promotions, it may have a social impact that needs to be considered when
prioritizing funds. A redundant facility such as a secondary runway (scenario J) might seem
extremely important for the Air Force. Still, when found in a location that does not have flying
objectives or the risk of losing the primary runway is negligible, it should be given a low MDI
score and identified as obsolete.
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From a project funding perspective, TMDI is 30% of the Air Force's multiplicative facility project
scoring model. Even though a majority of facility cases presented here have a minimal difference
between original and fuzzy logic-based TMDI, centralized project funding decisions at the margin
will benefit from this framework. For any large organization, capital improvement funds will be
limited, and there will be a final project funded and a first project not selected for funding. Using
a categorical approach, like the one the Air Force used, creates situations where many projects
have the same priority, making these marginal decisions difficult. The fuzzy logic approach
rectifies conflicts and makes it such that discerning between projects is simplified.

The relative consistency between the original and fuzzy logic-based outputs should be viewed
positively. The purpose of this study was not to meaningfully change the outcomes but to provide
a framework that 1) eliminates biases and risk ties; 2) creates distinguishment between facilities;
and 3) enables the addition of additional risk assessment parameters (Dependency) without adding
significant complexity for the decision-maker. To that end, the framework presented here is simple
and repeatable and can be used to link facilities to an organization's strategic objectives. The fuzzy
inference system presented can be easily calibrated to an individual organization's leadership or
decision-maker objectives.

Still, the vast majority of the fuzzy logic inference system parameters for the triangular and
Gaussian distributions are arbitrarily assigned, which is a significant limitation of this work. In the
Air Force case, AFCEC would likely be responsible for defining and calibrating the number of
risk categories, linguistic terms, distribution types, distribution interactions, and boundary

53

conditions for each objective-oriented question. While this up-front work is not simple, the value
of the information contained in the outputs is significantly higher than that of a traditional
approach.

Another limitation of this work is that it only assesses local risk. Echelons within the organizational
hierarchy between the installation and AFCEC have no input on TMDI scores. Although the
installation is most familiar with local conditions and local Dependency, higher authority levels
often have a broader perspective, which should also be included in a holistic, organizational-level
facilities risk assessment. Future research should investigate the inclusion of a reassessment of risk
at higher levels within the hierarchy.

Conclusion
Viewing facilities through the lens of organizational objectives is essential for portfolio managers
to accurately prioritize facilities and projects when resources are limited. Traditional risk matrices
can lead to ambiguous results, uncertainties, and inaccurate prioritizations, but they are commonly
used due to their simplicity and ease (Cox 2008; Nelson 2019; Smith et al. 2009). The fuzzy logicbased consequence of failure framework proposed in this work can be used by campus leadership
to link facilities to an organization's objectives when success or failure is not necessarily measured
monetarily. This framework is simple and repeatable and can be used to better prioritize resources,
understand the risk profile of a diverse campus, and identify organizational objective
vulnerabilities tied to facilities. While the framework presented here is calibrated to the United
States Air Force, non-military, hierarchically equivalent organizations, like a spatially distributed
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university or hospital campuses that are part of a more extensive system, could benefit from its
implementation.

A key benefit of the fuzzy logic approach is that objectives or assessment criteria can be added
without precipitously compounding complexity for the decision-makers. Here, facility
Dependency is added to Replicability and Interruptability as an example of expanding the risk
assessment criterion. In the implementation, the Dependency is manifested as simply another
question for a decision-maker to answer for each facility. However, the nature of the question is
identical to that of Replicability and Interruptability.

Decision-makers are likely to favor consistent and straightforward frameworks that expedite the
prioritization process and limit the degree to which bias can influence results. Another benefit of
a fuzzy logic-based approach is that the traditional risk matrix is absconded from the decision
maker's view, limiting the degree to which the decision-maker can "game," or match, the desired
score to their responses. While it is not addressed in this research, a user interface such as slider
bars for each question could replace the matrix interface. Not only would an implementation such
as this reduce gaming, but it would also expedite the facility risk assessment process.

Lastly, the purpose of a facility risk assessment and prioritization effort is to distinguish between
the importance or consequence of failure of facilities. The fuzzy logic-based approach reduces the
occurrence of identical score outcomes that plague categorical risk matrices. Achieving a
continuous order of merit for facilities enables decisive action concerning project funding at the
margins, and emergency response decisions, both when resources are constrained.
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Portfolio managers and campus leaders need to ensure limited resources are allocated
appropriately to campus construction and sustainment projects. Decision-makers need to
understand how facilities play a role in an organization's objectives while maximizing the value of
information collected and minimizing the time, resources, and complexity required to compare
and prioritize projects. This novel framework integrates fuzzy logic with a risk assessment
methodology to produce a facility prioritization that meets the needs of decision-makers, portfolio
managers, and campus leadership.
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III. A Fuzzy Inference-Based Facility Prioritization Decision Support System for Complex
Hierarchical Organizations
Devin DePalmer, Steven Schuldt, Justin Delorit
Abstract
Safeguarding limited resources for an organization's most critical assets can be difficult when
decision-makers at different corporate hierarchy levels have different objectives and needs.
Prioritizing resources in a manner that aligns with the organization's strategic goals requires
expertise and knowledge at all corporation levels. DePalmer et al. (2021) explored the opportunity
to quantify the relationship between facilities and the operations they support using a Mamdani
fuzzy inference system. This research extends the previous work by incorporating multi-level
perspectives of the facilities and the operations they support outside of the tactical campus.
Additionally, the authors simulated various risk attitudes to investigate how subjective inputs at
the tactical level can affect strategic-level outputs. This research produces a framework that
aggregates junior-level facility knowledge depth with the breadth of senior-level operational and
strategic knowledge to support decision-making for facility project prioritization. An additional
prediction boundary is created from the risk attitude variance and can give portfolio managers
data-driven tools for quality control of risk profiles at individual campus locations.
Introduction
Authorizing facilities and infrastructure projects in a manner that aligns with organizational
objectives can be difficult when the organization has a multi-level, hierarchical structure
(Hafezalkotob and Hafezalkotob 2017). The leaders of these complex organizations are
responsible for many dispersed operating locations and or facilities and face the arduous task of
making decisions for a built asset portfolio for which they may rarely have physical oversight. To
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ensure facility prioritizations reflect both the organizational objectives and local operational
realities, company leadership should rely on a mixture of both local facility manager input and
corporate influence. Regardless of the organization's hierarchical management structure, e.g.,
functional, divisional, or matrix, a multi-level framework that targets bottom-up prioritization
could more accurately reflect the value generated by facilities, provided the organization clearly
represents its objectives in the organizational framework (DePalmer et al. 2021). This research
aims to expand previous research by DePalmer et al. (2021) to account for multi-level input in
prioritizing facilities by assessing Dependency and analyzing various risk attitudes among
decision-makers participating in the prioritization process.

Corporate hierarchy refers to the layers of vertical authority within a company based on job
function and status (Kenton 2020; Reitzig and Maciejovsky 2015). Typically pyramid shaped with
the most influential positions located towards the top, a corporate hierarchy can represent a chain
of command of decision-making authority and scope of responsibility for organizational goals
(Kenton 2020). Each level of hierarchy may have different organizational objectives and expertise
areas. For example, the corporation's strategic level sets the company's direction or goals but is
blind to a single facility's operations at the tactical level. Conversely, a facility manager
understands how the facility enables the operations at the tactical level, but not its role at the
strategic level. The corporation's value of the facility is determined with information from all
levels. When facilities must compete at higher levels of the organization for funding, their value
must be accurate and comparable. The organization can represent these hierarchy levels in many
ways such as local, regional, and national; tactical, operational, and strategic; city, county, and
state; etc. Incorporating expert facility information from each hierarchy level ensures the
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corporation can prioritize the most critical sustainment and maintenance projects within an
extensive and diverse project portfolio.

Facility project prioritization methodologies focus on three necessary steps for project
prioritization: (1) identifying factors important to decision-making, (2) evaluating these factors,
and (3) ranking the projects (Akgun et al. 2010; Andres et al. 2016; Bowles and Peláez 1995;
Bozbura and Beskese 2007; Jamshidi et al. 2013; Markowski and Mannan 2008; Moazami et al.
2011; Shaygan and Testik 2019). The essential factors used for project prioritization and their
respective weighting should align with the organization's strategic objectives (Hannach et al.
2016). However, this previous research identified by DePalmer et al. (2021) failed to incorporate
information for corporations with an organizational hierarchy of decision-making for facility
operation. It also fails to quantify how external influences of human decision-making from
subjective inputs affect the results.

Realistically, project prioritization methodologies can expand across multiple levels of the
corporate hierarchy. Decision-maker input value may depend on the company's structure and the
decision-makers' expertise level or position (Hafezalkotob and Hafezalkotob 2017; Yazdi et al.
2020). Corporations may value junior-level decision-maker inputs equally to senior-level inputs,
using a democratic-style decision-making process, or they could favor a more autocratic style,
giving final judgment to the senior decision-maker. Few studies have incorporated hierarchical
decision-making and the effect on final prioritizations. Hafezalkotob and Hafezalkotob (2017) was
the first study focused on this topic by incorporating fuzzy best-worst method to create an optimal
weighting system model for integrating senior and junior decision-maker opinions during decision
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making. More recently, Yazdi et al. (2020) developed a model for prioritizing system failures for
a supercritical water gasification system using Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA), which is
flexible for autocratic and democratic decision-making processes.

Technology-oriented decision tools, such as decision support systems (DSS), are commonly used
to enhance the quality of human decision-making, encourage rational thinking, reduce bias, and
avoid errors (Phillips-Wren et al. 2019). Decision-making is useful when a proposed solution is
related to desired goals and relevant to the decision in question (Power et al. 2019). However,
cognitive biases, individual decision styles, and risk attitudes are all internal influences for human
decision-making that allow decision-makers to believe their choices are rational when in reality,
these factors influence them towards a sub-optimal decision (Phillips-Wren et al. 2019). Cognitive
processing limitations cause people to rely on heuristics to reduce complexity when asked to
determine subjective judgments (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Tversky and Kahneman identified
three significant heuristics commonly used in decision-making to predict values and assess
probabilities: representativeness, availability, and anchoring. These heuristics can influence how
individual decision styles and cognitive biases affect decision-makers and how they interact with
the decision support tool. Additionally, the personal risk attitudes of the decision-makers can
influence rational decision-making. Decision-makers are typically modeled as risk-taking, riskneutral, or risk-averse to determine the degree to which risk attitudes can impact the way agents
will interact with the technology-based DSS (Delorit and Block 2020; Holt and Laury 2002;
Phillips-Wren et al. 2019). Risk-averse individuals may overestimate subjective inputs, while risktaking attitudes may underestimate these same variables. Improving the quality of decisions can
be accomplished when the DSS considers the influences seen on the decision-makers. System

60

architects should build tools with the constraints of human decision-making in mind (Kahneman
and Tversky 2012; Phillips-Wren et al. 2019; Power et al. 2019; Tversky and Kahneman 1974).
The researchers included a sensitivity analysis to understand how subjective input variance in
human decision-making can affect the operational and strategic consequence of failure scores
determined in this methodology.

Rational decision-making for portfolio prioritization requires quantifying risk to understand
alternative outcomes (Kaplan and Garrick 1981). Since the 1980s, researchers have studied risk.
Researchers have yet to establish a standardized risk formula due to the diverse risk analysis
applications and the complex relationships between identifying direct and indirect risk variables
(Karimpour et al. 2016). The linguistic terms used to categorize and estimate risk invite
uncertainty and bias into the risk assessment (Akgun et al. 2010; Jamshidi et al. 2013; Karimpour
et al. 2016; Markowski and Mannan 2008; Nelson 2019). Many assessment methodologies like
analytical hierarchy process (AHP) (Bozbura and Beskese 2007; Moazami et al. 2011; Shaygan
and Testik 2019); failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) (Bowles and Peláez
1995); risk matrices (Markowski and Mannan 2008); and vulnerability assessments (Akgun et al.
2010) have used fuzzy logic to capture uncertainty in risk assessments. Karimpour et al. (2016)
determined the benefits for integrating fuzzy logic with risk assessments include: expressing the
possibility rather than the likelihood of an outcome; using logical rules rather than complex
arithmetic formulas; using insufficient, vague, or imprecise data; and the ease for managers to
understand results. Some of the disadvantages of fuzzy logic are the need for subjective inputs
and the expert knowledge required to establish rules and calibrate membership functions
(Karimpour et al. 2016; Zadeh 1965). These benefits suggest that fuzzy logic is a tool that DSS
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designers can use to improve human decision-making quality with technology-oriented decision
tools.
Despite the significant contributions of the aforementioned topics, there are gaps in the literature
about fuzzy prioritization methods for organizations with a hierarchical structure. This paper
addresses those gaps by aggregating lower-level expert information of a system's Interruptability,
Replicability, and Intra-Dependency with higher-level Inter-Dependency inputs utilizing a fuzzy
inference system. This system architecture provides information for how a single facility failure
can affect the corporation's overall strategic objectives by determining a consequence of failure
metric at each hierarchical level of the company for prioritizing resources. The authors expanded
DePalmer et al. (2021) 's research to the company's operational and strategic organizational
hierarchy level. Organizations value senior-level expertise for its broader scope of responsibility
and knowledge about the system in which each facility operates. Junior-level expertise is valued
because of their in-depth understanding of the facility and its link to tactical objectives. A
sensitivity analysis is performed on the junior-level results to show how subjective judgment can
affect overall results. Corporate leadership can use this information to ensure a bias-reduced
decision-making process is used to calculate the consequence of facility failure for corporate
strategic objectives.

Case Study and Background: The United States Air Force Mission Dependency Index
The Air Force is a large, complex, and diverse corporation that could benefit from a repeatable
risk assessment methodology to prioritize facility construction and sustainment projects. Like
many other private and public corporations, the Air Force's strategic objectives are not profit-
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motivated and will need to assess risk and prioritize projects without using a cost-based analysis
(Hannach et al. 2016; National Research Council 2004). Corporations with similar objectives and
organizational structure of the Air Force also need a simple, repeatable process that can help them
assess the consequence of failure across individually operated and spatially distributed campuses
or assets. Additional operational and strategic decision-maker input is essential to organizations
whose tactical operations are independently run to focus momentum and ensure proper direction
towards its strategic objectives. The methodology currently used by the USAF to prioritize their
portfolio is risk-based and can be integrated with fuzzy logic to improve decision-making and
optimize resource allocation (DePalmer et al. 2021). The improvements to the methodology
proposed in this paper apply to other hierarchical organizations that use a consequence of failure
metric to make risk-based decisions or prioritizations.

The Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) currently requires Air Force Civil Engineers to
create an annual Integrated Priority List (IPL) of candidate facility improvement projects that must
compete for approval and funding (AFCEC 2020). The IPL is a list of facility projects ordered by
highest to lowest technical score. The technical score indicates to decision-makers a level of risk
to the organization if the project goes unfunded. Engineers calculate the technical score by
multiplying the project's Probability of Failure (PoF) with its Consequence of Failure (CoF). PoF
is determined using historical data from the Air Force's Sustainment Management System
BUILDER. PoF represents the facility's condition on a scale of 1 to 100, with one being the best
condition (lowest PoF) and 100 being the worst (highest PoF). The CoF is a measurement of
facility importance and also measured on a scale of 1 to 100, with one being the least important
and 100 being the most important (the highest consequence of failure). Engineers calculate the
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CoF by combining the facility's Mission Dependency Index (MDI) and the project's priority
ranking from senior-level decision-makers. MDI is a metric used by the DoD other similar
government agencies like NASA to quantify the importance of the relationship between facilities
and the mission they enable (Antelman et al. 2008; Antelman and Miller 2002; Savatgy et al.
2019). The project's priority ranking by senior-level decision-makers is valuable to the Air Force
to ensure leadership perspective remains an important factor in determining the final project
approval scores. AFCEC combines all installation's IPL to make funding authorization decisions
from highest to lowest technical project score. This order ensures the Air Force allocates funds to
the highest-scoring projects across the enterprise first, due to limited resources available each year
(AFCEC 2020).

Presently, Air Force Civil Engineers calculate tactical MDI with a traditional risk matrix
constituted by a likelihood and severity analysis of Replicability and Interruptability. Each variable
is broken into four categories, producing a possibility of 16 combinational outcomes. Although
traditional risk matrices are low-cost to assemble and simple to use, they are heavily criticized for
their sub-optimal mathematical analysis and are easily prone to errors through user cognitive biases
or subjective categories (Cox 2008; Duijm 2015; International Electrotechnical Commission 2019;
Li et al. 2018; Siefert and Smith 2011). The logarithmic scale and additive scoring combination
used for the MDI variables result in risk score ties, reducing granularity further, and providing 14
unique MDI matrix scores between 100 and 40. To increase the range of possible MDI scores, the
Air Force re-scores all assets with an MDI of 40 based on the facility type (Savatgy et al. 2019).
This methodology is problematic because it inaccurately links the MDI score to the facility's type
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rather than its function. The re-scoring process can lead to mismatched MDI scores and the need
for an additional score adjudication process (Blaess 2017; Nichols 2015; Smith 2016).

DePalmer et al. (2021) investigated the MDI prioritization methodology. They integrated the
process with a fuzzy logic inference system (FIS) that used the inputs of Interruptability,
Replicability, and Dependency to output a CoF score, identified as tactical MDI (TMDI). This
methodology builds upon the TMDI FIS to include senior-level Inter-Dependency information at
the organization's operational and strategic levels. Senior-level decision-makers currently
determine priority ranking points with only qualitative data. Qualitative data is simple and can be
used when quantitative data is unavailable, inadequate, or under a limited budget and time
constraints (Radu 2009). Unfortunately, qualitative assessments do not provide enough
information for extensive evaluations, do not capture uncertainty, and are incredibly subjective
data points (International Electrotechnical Commission et al. 2019). Senior-level decision-makers
can use priority points to manipulate the final technical score of projects and tarnish the risk
assessment's validity and objectivity, project prioritization methodology, and approval process.
This research does not include changing the PoF metric. Instead, it focuses on integrating fuzzy
logic as a risk-assessment methodology at all of the organization's hierarchy levels to eliminate the
need for senior-level priority ranking in the CoF metric and simultaneously create a more accurate
and less biased project prioritization methodology.

The MDI's operational and strategic value goes beyond project prioritization for AFCEC's IPL.
Corporate leadership and facility planning teams can use this metric to understand how specific
facilities enable operations at their location and how each facility is linked to other critical
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infrastructure or mission sets throughout the organization. Additionally, MDI can be used to
differentiate between primary or secondary operations within a facility or installation, link
operations to space needs, or model dynamic mission needs at the operational or strategic level
(Heron et al. 2017). Every level of the organization can use the tactical, operational, or strategic
level information this system produces to understand how a facility failure may have cascading
effects, allowing decision-makers to make better choices for the organization as a whole.

Methodology
The authors expanded the fuzzy logic methodology used in DePalmer et al. (2021) to account for
multi-level input for prioritizing facilities with an assessment of Inter-Dependency and an analysis
of how a variety of risk attitudes from decision-makers can affect the prioritization process. The
system is shown in Figure 2 and specifies this research's scope compared to DePalmer et al. (2021).
This study makes use of the initial results from AFIMSC's TMDI re-baselining survey. For this
survey, local facility managers used a traditional risk matrix to quantify their facility's Replicability
and Interruptability for over 54,000 facilities at 79 installation (campus) locations worldwide.
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Figure 10. Paper scope and methodology for Strategic Mission Dependency Index (SMDI)
creation. The blue text is the focus of this research, and the red text indicates research completed
by DePalmer et al. (2021). Fuzzy system boundaries and input variables are marked with a
dashed line, while solid lines indicate a crisp input value.

The tactical level MDI score provides information about the Interruptability, Replicability, and
Intra-Dependency of a facility (DePalmer et al. 2021). Interruptability indicates how fast the
impact to campus's overall operations would be if functional capabilities of the facility were
interrupted. Survey responders assume the interrupted facility is completely unavailable due to
some disruption caused by deferred preventative maintenance. Replicability indicates how
difficult it would be for the campus to relocate or replicate its functional capabilities if the facility
were interrupted (Savatgy et al. 2019). Intra-Dependency shows the percent of other mission sets
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at the tactical level that relies on the facility's operations for success. This paper introduces
additional hierarchy-levels and information about Inter-Dependency. Inter-Dependency is
distinguished from Intra-Dependency as it indicates the percent of other mission sets at the
operational and strategic level that rely on the facility's operations for mission success. The
Operational Mission Dependency Index (OMDI) score and Strategic Mission Dependency Index
(SMDI) score use the outputs of the score produced at the subordinate hierarchical level as crisp
inputs to their fuzzy inference system (FIS). Each FIS runs in series to one another to provide
separate output results at each hierarchy level. Information from each tier is independent of one
another since the fuzzy system hides the fuzzified subordinate level's inputs. The resultant CoF
outputs of TMDI, OMDI, and SMDI indicate the risk to different hierarchical levels from a
facility's outage or failure.

Building the Operational and Strategic Dependency FIS
The FIS used in this work follows the same four-step process as the previous research of DePalmer
et al. (2021): (1) membership functions are designed to enable continuous input; (2) membership
functions are developed for outputs; (3) rules for the risk-based-matrix and fuzzy system are
established; (4) outcomes are evaluated graphically to ensure the prioritization of facilities is
consistent with decision-maker priorities. It is essential that the system designers accurately
calibrate the membership functions to fit the expert's logical rules because each component of the
fuzzy logic system influences the outcome.
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Step 1. Establish membership functions for inputs
The operational FIS used TMDI and operational Inter-Dependency as inputs. The Tactical FIS,
previously established by DePalmer et al. (2021), output a crisp TMDI score is re-fuzzified into
the Operational FIS. Inter-Dependency is defined here by the number of facilities, expressed as a
percent of total missions at the operational level, that depends on the success of the facility in
question. Inter-Dependency is divided into three membership functions of High, Medium, and
Low, and is the other half of the input for OMDI. The Strategic FIS operates identically to the
Operational FIS, though it uses OMDI and strategic Inter-Dependency as input categories.

The authors determined membership functions for all inputs to be triangular and trapezoidal for
the system's simplicity. Triangular membership functions were used to simplify the model and for
their effectiveness representing uncertainty between categories. TMDI and OMDI were divided
into five membership functions to simulate the commonly classified MDI risk categories
established by the Navy and Army (Amekudzi and McNeil 2008; Grussing et al. 2010). The risk
levels determined each category's boundaries, and the range of values was set from [0,100], similar
to the existing MDI score range. All membership functions for TMDI and OMDI inputs were
equally spaced from 0 to 100. System designers can calibrate these functions to fit leadership and
decision-maker needs. The authors determined the membership function's range by aligning each
category's peak with equal spacing between categories to achieve a maximum score of 100 and a
minimum score of 0. Inter-Dependency was divided into three trapezoidal membership functions
and had a range of [0, 1]. The Inter-Dependency range was set with the intent that there was a
maximum value of 100% and a minimum value of 0%. This range was set to indicate the
percentage of other facilities at the operational or strategic level that relied on a facility's success.
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The authors determined Low, Medium, and High membership function limits with realism and
practicality in mind. Fuzzy degrees of truth had equal rates of change between Low - Medium and
Medium - High Dependency levels. Input fuzzy set ranges and linguistic terms are summarized in
Table 4. These membership function ranges and limits can be easily calibrated to match an
organization's leadership or decision-maker opinions. This fuzzy system establishes a clearly
defined evaluation process with common terminology (National Research Council 2004). For
additional detail on the construction and function of the FIS, readers are directed to DePalmer et
al. (2021).

It is important to note that a corporation's leadership can re-define Inter-Dependency, or set a
different analysis metric based on organizational objectives. Inter-Dependency links tactical,
operational, and strategic levels based on Air Force stakeholders' communications. It is
purposefully simplified here to maintain the interpretability of results, aligning with the Air Force's
strategic purpose for its MDI framework. Dependency assessment is modeled as independent at
the tactical, operational, and strategic levels and is determined by an unbiased analysis of
connections between facilities. That is, TMDI inputs and outputs are hidden from operational level
assessors when assigning inter-dependencies, as well as OMDI, during the strategic assessment.
This blind input system was intended to limit influence from the human decision-making biases
but could be eliminated based on decision-maker preferences.

Step 2. Establish membership functions for outputs
The operational level FIS outputs the OMDI value, and the strategic level FIS outputs the SMDI
value. The OMDI and SMDI fuzzy inference systems are identical in function and therefore are
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described as one system in this section. The output was divided into five membership functions to
match the commonly classified MDI risk categories established by the Navy and Army (Amekudzi
and McNeil 2008; Grussing et al. 2010). The risk levels determined each category's boundaries,
and the range of values was set from [0,100] to match the existing TMDI score range. Triangular
membership functions were used to simplify the model and for their effectiveness representing
uncertainty between categories. All membership functions were equally spaced from 0 to 100 and
can be calibrated to fit leadership and decision-maker opinions. The output fuzzy set ranges and
established terms are displayed in Table 4. For additional detail on the construction and function
of the FIS, readers are directed to DePalmer et al. (2021).
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Table 4. FIS Membership functions and input ranges for each hierarchy level MDI score
Linguistic Terms
(Fuzzy Set)

Description range

Universe of
Discourse

(0 ≤ D ≤ 0.4)
(0.2 ≤ D ≤ 0.8)
(0.6 ≤ D ≤ 1)

,! ∈ (0,1)

VH: Very High
H: High
M: Medium
L: Low
VL: Very Low

(75 < VH ≤ 100)
(50 < H < 100)
(25 < M ≤ 75)
(0 < L ≤ 50)
(−25 ≤ VL ≤ 25)

," ∈ (0,100)

VH: Very High
H: High
M: Medium
L: Low
VL: Very Low

(75 < VH ≤ 100)
(50 < H < 100)
(25 < M ≤ 75)
(0 < L ≤ 50)
(−25 ≤ VL ≤ 25)

,# ∈ (0,100)

Inter-Dependency
(D)

Low
Medium
High

TMDI
(T)

OMDI
(O)

Membership Function

(75 < VH ≤ 100)
(50 < H < 100)
(25 < M ≤ 75)
(0 < L ≤ 50)
(−25 ≤ VL ≤ 25)

Medium

,$ ∈ (0,100)

Very High

0.6

0.4

0.2

-20

0

20

Very Low

40

1

Low

60
Medium

80
High

100

120

Very High

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0

-20

0

20

40

60

SMDI
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High

OMDI

Degree of membership

VH: Very High
H: High
M: Medium
L: Low
VL: Very Low

Low

0.8

0

SMDI
(S)

Very Low

1

Degree of membership

Linguistic
Variable

80

100

120

Step 3. Establish rules for the fuzzy system
The fuzzy inference system maps fuzzified hierarchy-level MDI and Inter-Dependency inputs to
hierarchy level outputs to create a crisp CoF score. The rules established for the inference system
determine the actions of the system and are presented simply as:

!" $! %& '"! ()* $# %& '"# ()* … $$ %& '"$ ,-./ 0 %& 1" (345 % = 1,2,3 … ;)

(3)

Where $" is the input variable; '"$ and 1" are linguistic terms; 0 is the output variable; and ; is
the number of rules. This structure is simple compared to other approaches, and it simulates the
complexity of human decision-making (Lee 1990).

Rules for the fuzzy logic system were determined for applicability of the system and shown in
Figure 11. The authors created 15 Boolean-logic rules for each department-level FIS to correspond
to all the possible Inter-Dependency and department-level MDI outcomes within the fuzzy
systems. The Medium Inter-Dependency level was used as the baseline for the operational-level
FIS, and outputs were either increased or decreased for High and Low Inter-Dependency. The
strategic-level FIS started with the Low Inter-Dependency as the expected baseline response and
increased or decreased the final consequence output accordingly. These rules were set as examples
for building the system architecture and need to be calibrated and established by the organization's
correct asset management experts. The fuzzy system's rules link inputs and outputs and must reflect
the system owner's needs.
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Operational MDI
T
M
D
I

Very High
High
Medium
Low
Very Low

Inter-Dependency
Low
Medium
High
H
VH
VH
M
H
VH
L
M
H
VL
L
M
VL
VL
L

Strategic MDI
O
M
D
I

Very High
High
Medium
Low
Very Low

Inter-Dependency
Low
Medium
High
H
H
VH
M
H
VH
M
M
H
L
M
H
VL
L
M

Figure 11. Boolean logic rules established for the Operational (a, left) and Strategic (b, right)
level FIS.
This system continues the fuzzy inference methodology from DePalmer et al. (2021) using a
Mamdani fuzzy model. This Mamdani model applies the minimum operator for the "AND" method
and the maximum operator for the "OR" method of rules. The defuzzification method used for the
operational and strategic level was the centroid method. Centroid defuzzification returns the center
of gravity of the fuzzy set along the x-axis (Equation 4).

$=

∑! &((! )(!
∑! &((! )

(4)

Where >($" ) is the degree of truth for point $" on the universe of discourse ?. For additional detail
on the construction and function of the FIS, readers are directed to DePalmer et al. (2021).

Step 4. Evaluate outputs graphically
The FIS's outputs for Operational MDI and Strategic MDI were evaluated by reviewing the surface
plots produced. The final fuzzy risk surfaces show the difference in output consequence as the
department-level MDI and Inter-Dependency change (Figure 12). As expected, the rules and
membership functions of the system determine the final fuzzy surface. It is paramount that
corporate experts choose the appropriate rules for each FIS's calibration to ensure the final surface
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reflects the organizational objectives and the linkages between different organizational levels of
input. For this research, both surfaces must have positive or zero slopes for the Z-axis. This slope
ensures that as the inputs increase, the CoF at each department-level does not decrease as their
inputs increase.

Figure 12. Risk surface plot for a (left) Operational MDI, and b (right) Strategic MDI.

Since the framework has each hierarchy in series, it is essential to recognize that the resulting
outputs are re-fuzzified for inputs at the higher level and only reflect the department's crisp
consequence score. For example, the OMDI will equal 100 when the TMDI is held at 100, and
operational Inter-Dependency increases from Medium to High. A facility classified as [100, 0.5]
at the Operational level will have the same OMDI score of 100 as a facility classified as [100,
0.90]. When both of these output OMDI consequences are used in the Strategic FIS, they have an
equal opportunity to change. The SMDI FIS does not see the Inter-Dependency difference at the
operational level; it only sees the resulting OMDI score of 100. While the system's primary goal
is to create an overall prioritization method, leadership can use CoF's crisp outputs at each level
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for better strategic decision-making in other portfolio management areas besides competing for
project authorization funds. Additional details are provided in the discussion.

Sensitivity Analysis and Simulating Data
Decision-makers at all levels can be tricked into believing they are making rational decisions when,
in reality, they are influenced by their cognitive biases and personal risk attitudes (Kahneman and
Tversky 2012; Phillips-Wren et al. 2019; Power et al. 2019; Siefert and Smith 2011). When
resources are limited, these sub-optimal decisions lead to wasted efforts. System architects should
analyze these influences and uncertainties and put protection measures in place to mitigate them.
System architects can use fuzzy logic in semi-quantitative risk assessments to capture the
uncertainty between classes of objects (Duijm 2015; Markowski and Mannan 2008; Zadeh 1965).
Once this uncertainty is analyzed, acceptable tolerances can be determined by the organization's
leadership to quality control the system. Additionally, the scaling or descriptions used for the
universe of discourse for inputs can be adjusted and calibrated to avoid ambiguity or subjectivity
of crisp inputs.

A sensitivity analysis was performed with the subjective inputs of Replicability and
Interruptability to analyze the effect of risk attitudes and cognitive biases on MDI. It was assumed
that simulated crisp inputs would closely mirror the actual TMDI survey responses for all facilities,
and simulated responses would have a degree of membership greater than 0.5 for the original
category chosen. This range ensures the crisp inputs vary only between the uncertainty between
categories. For example, if the TMDI survey response for Replicability was "Extremely Difficult",
the distribution of simulated crisp inputs would range from [3.5, 4.5]. A triangular membership
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function was used because of the simplicity of setting maximum, minimum, and peak location for
each simulated response's crisp input. Figure 13 shows the simulated response ranges for results
within the membership functions, and Table 5 identifies maximum and minimum values used for
crisp input simulations. The maximum and minimum values of each triangular distribution were
set for all survey responses, and the peak location varied between these limits. Because the
Available and No Mission Impact categories were not part of the original TMDI survey, the authors
assumed no more than 25% of assets would be identified to have Replicability or Interruptability
crisp inputs of less than 1 (less than 0 degrees of membership of Prolonged or Possible). The range
for the Prolonged and Possible responses between [0.75, 2.5] was set with this limit in mind. The
triangular distributions were varied with Equation 5.
@ = ( + B(%)(C − ()

(5)

Where ( is the minimum limit to the triangular distribution, @ is the peak value of the triangular
distribution, and C is the maximum limit to the triangular distribution. B represents the decision
maker's personal attitudes and ranges from 0 to 1. A decision-maker's %, risk attitude of B =
0 indicates the maximum level of risk-taking, and B = 1 indicates the maximum level of riskaversion. A decision-maker with B = 0.5 means a risk-neutral attitude. When decision-makers
have a D = 0 value, the distributed results have a peak value (@) at the minimum value (() for the
subjective input. This would indicate that the decision-makers have a risk-taking attitude, and the
crisp inputs belong closer to the category below, reducing the crisp input of the subjective variable
and potentially the final consequence of failure score.
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Figure 13. How maximum and minimum limits for triangular distribution were established to
simulate crisp inputs for TMDI survey results
Table 5. Maximum and minimum values used for simulating triangular distributions for crisp
inputs to TMDI survey responses of Interruptability and Replicability.

Variable
Interruptability

Category
Immediate
Brief
Short
Prolonged

Minimum
a
4.5
3.5
2.5
0.75

Replicability

Impossible
Extremely Difficult
Difficult
Possible

4.5
3.5
2.5
0.75
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Maximum
b
5.5
4.5
3.5
2.5
5.5
4.5
3.5
2.5

The tactical, operational, and strategic level Dependency responses were simulated to validate the
fuzzy logic system's architectural framework. Crisp input values of Dependency ranged from 0 to
1 and were determined using a Pearson distribution. Each department level's distribution values
can be seen in Table 6. The cumulative distribution of simulated Dependency inputs can be seen
with the membership functions overlayed in Figure 14, showing the difference between the
tactical, operational, and strategic level distributions. Other distributions would affect the overall
results of the sensitivity analysis.
Table 6. Simulated Dependency values for tactical, operational, and strategic level

Department Level
Tactical
Operational
Strategic

Mean
H
0.6
0.5
0.4

Standard
Deviation
I
0.166
0.166
0.166

Skewness
-0.75
0
0.75

Kurtosis
(Normal = 3)
3
3
3

These values were determined with the assumption that facilities become less Inter-Dependent as
they increase in managerial level. This assumption is because facilities should be highly IntraDependent at the tactical level due to their geographic proximity and the need for entire operating
locations to function independently. Conversely, as the hierarchy level increases, the facility is less
likely to be unique or provide services across the entire department's responsibility scope. For
example, each tactical-level location may have a facility that has a high Inter-Dependency at their
campus. This facility is useful at the tactical level and commonly found at every location. Because
this requirement is satisfied at multiple campuses, the operational level may not classify the need
for a high Inter-Dependency between that specific facility and other campuses since their needs
are being met locally.
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Figure 14. Dependency Cumulative Distribution Function plot, describing the density of each
department level's simulated crisp Dependency input
Results
The fuzzy system was successfully implemented to produce the consequence of failure scores at
each department level with simulated response inputs. These results are specific to the simulation
inputs, and true results will be dependent on the verified responses from decision-makers at the
tactical, operational, and strategic department levels. Simulated results were used to determine the
final fit parameters of the polynomial regression. Although stylized, this process can be repeated
with true results, and multi-level influence can be analyzed at a low computational cost. This
analysis can inform future investments and serve as quality control for locations with unacceptable
risk tolerance.
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The cumulative distribution function percentiles were plotted and fit with a polynomial regression
line to quantify the effect of decision-maker risk attitudes on MDI variability across the range of
possible scores. The polynomial regression coefficients and goodness of fit statistics can be seen
in Table 7, and the results of the expected MDI and the 95% prediction bounds for each hierarchy
level can be seen graphically in Figure 15. These results will change as the membership functions
and rules are calibrated by decision-makers and serve the purpose of creating an acceptable risk
attitude boundary for the proposed prioritization framework.
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Table 7. Polynomial Regression Coefficients and Goodness of Fit Statistics for Tactical,
Operational, and Strategic level Risk Attitudes

Department
Level
Tactical

Operational

Strategic

Generalized Fit Model 3($) = J! $ # + J# $ + J*
Coefficients
RAdj R(95% confidence bounds)
square
Square
0.96
0.96
J! = −3.52 × 10+,
+,
+,
(−4.19 × 10 , −2.83 × 10 )
J# = 1.37 × 10+#
(1.30 × 10+# , 1.45 × 10+# )
J* = −7.04 × 10+#
(−8.79 × 10+# , −5.29 × 10+# )

SSE
1.60

RMSE
0.06

J! = −2.64 × 10+,
(−3.20 × 10+, , −2.09 × 10+, )
J# = 1.28 × 10+#
(1.22 × 10+# , 1.34 × 10+# )
J* = −5.07 × 10+#
(−6.46 × 10+# , −3.68 × 10+# )

0.97

0.97

1.14

0.05

J! = 3.26 × 10+,
(1.95 × 10+, , 4.57 × 10+, )
J# = 1.20 × 10+#
(1.06 × 10+# , 1.34 × 10+# )
J* = −0.23
(−0.27, −0.20)

0.94

0.94

2.46

0.07

Although specific to the assumptions made for this simulation, these types of quantifications give
senior-level quality control managers data-driven tools to ensure responses fall within expected or
acceptable ranges and can be used to identify outlier locations or assess whether categorical risk
behavior exists within sections of the MDI range. Like upper and lower control limits, the 95%
prediction bounds serve as the threshold for acceptable risk attitude behavior. The width of the
bounds indicates the uncertainty associated with the fitted risk curve. Non-simultaneous
observation bounds measure with 95% confidence that a new observation will lie within the
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interval specified given the predicted inputs of CDF percentile and department-level MDI
(MathWorks, Inc 2020). The prediction bounds are useful for a case-by-case analysis of a base's
overall risk profile and for company leadership to understand the expected variance of results. If a
campus's results are within the boundaries, their responses are within the expected risk tolerance
threshold. If an operating location's risk profile is outside of these thresholds, the location's
responses may require a manual review. This review can identify if locations need supplementary
education about properly using the system or if there are assets that need redistribution or
additional redundancies to ensure each portfolio has a balanced risk profile. Additionally, this
review can reveal extreme risk attitudes that may warrant extreme risk-aversion due to security
concerns at the campus location.
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Figure 15. Cumulative Distribution Plot for tactical (a, top), operational (b, middle), and strategic
(c, bottom) department levels showing the change in cumulative distribution as decision-maker
attitude is altered. The blue dashed lines indicate the 95% prediction bounds for the fitted risk
curve.
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In the final results for SMDI (Figure 15c), there are two prominent vertical asymptotes at
SMDI 50 and SMDI 75. These asymptotes are due to the large percentage of flat surface
area on the FIS's produced risk surface (Figure 12b). The risk surface is a visual translation
of the determined fuzzy rules for the FIS. These asymptotes can be avoided by adjusting
the rules or adding more granularity to the framework through additional membership
functions for possible outputs. These vertical asymptotes indicate MDI score ties and can
make determining the order to fund facilities a challenge for leadership if the financial
funding limit were to fall between multiple assets with equal SMDI. The rules and
membership functions for the true system should be calibrated to minimize risk score ties.
Discussion
In addition to adding dimensionality, Inter-Dependency from the operational and strategic
levels of a corporation can help facility management teams better understand a facility
failure's overall impact. These inputs are valuable for facilities that enable organizational
goals beyond the department-level. Figure 16 shows a Low-Medium TMDI score that is
transformed into a High-Very High consequence score through the OMDI and SMDI
evaluations due to a high degree of operational and strategic Dependency on the facility's
mission. This example demonstrates how multiple department-level consequence scores
should be taken into consideration during corporate facility prioritization. This example
also demonstrates the limitation of the prioritization methodology if it only takes into
account the tactical level of knowledge about a facility and the operations it enables.
Creating crisp MDI outputs at each hierarchical level within the organization reveals how
the risk value differentiation affects the score, enables better risk-based decisions, and
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increases the understanding of the non-linear impact facility failure may have on the
various levels of the organization.

Figure 16. Example of how a facility's tactical MDI score changes when senior-level
experts evaluate it. This may indicate the facility operations are secondary to other
facilities at the tactical level but critically important to the organization as a whole. This
information must be captured for decision-makers to effectively prioritize projects and
analyze risk.
The prediction bounds established in the risk attitude sensitivity analysis create a boundary
of acceptable risk tolerance for department levels or responding groups. By establishing
these boundaries, quality control managers can ensure users are interacting with the system
appropriately and portfolio risk profiles are balanced to an acceptable level across
operating location and facility type. The resulting prediction bounds were examined at the
tactical level for five different Air Force Base locations seen in Figure 17. Base A's
resulting cumulative distribution indicates that responses may be too risk-taking for the
organization's risk preference, while Base B and Base C may be too risk-averse. The results
suggest these three locations require additional review of their responses. After
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investigation, it was found that Base A had the lowest average TMDI value of all 79
locations in the survey. Base A may be under-valuing its facilities compared to other
similar campus locations and may benefit from facility disposal or asset redistribution. For
example, Base A is geographically located such that many of the community support
functions, e.g., lodging, childcare, grocery, and gym facilities, are replicated off-base by
private entities. Divesting these asset types could remedy the graphical result and lower the
total operating costs of the base.

Base B and Base C are located in geographically similar locations outside of the United
States and require additional critical infrastructure due to their required independence from
the local community and proximity to kinetic threat. These points alone may justify the
categorial risk aversion, and decision-makers should look for opportunities to re-balance
base B and C's risk profile with system redundancies or look to redistribute critical assets
to locations within geographic proximity of Bases B and C to mitigate risk-aversion. Base
D and E are both within the 95% prediction bounds and suggest that although Base D seems
more risk-taking than Base A, the difference in risk attitude is acceptable given the
organization's thresholds and the Bases' have a balanced risk profile.
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Figure 17. Example of five unique bases TMDI results with the risk boundaries for the
cumulative distribution function.
This research's limitations are the multiple assumptions made to simulate data at different
corporate hierarchy levels is a significant limitation of this work. Although the system's
membership functions and rules were estimated with realism and simplicity in mind, it is
the responsibility of the using organization to calibrate the system so results fit their need.
These assumptions make it possible to create a consequence of failure risk assessment
framework that considers higher hierarchical level objectives. Weighting each hierarchical
level is possible to change leadership influence but was not investigated for this research
due to the added complexity of inclusion and the formulation's theoretical nature. Future
research is needed for different types of organizational hierarchy templates and democraticautocratic weighting changes.
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Due to the application of this methodology within national defense, the protection of SMDI
and OMDI data is a necessary requirement and limitation of this research. When directly
linking specific assets to an operational or strategic priority, this information can be used
not just for the benefit of the organization but also to the benefit of an adversary when
looking for system vulnerabilities. This can cause additional costs from security measures
needed to protect information and clear access to vetted individuals only.

This framework can prioritize facility projects and identify risk profiles at the tactical,
operational, or strategic level. This framework links facilities to the organizational
objectives they enable without the use of monetary objectives or profits and can benefit
similarly organized public and private entities who have a hierarchical structure, e.g.,
education, healthcare, corporate, or government agencies. An advantage of using fuzzy
logic for the risk assessment is that the system can be easily manipulated to add or change
components without additional complexities to the system architect or decision-makers.

Conclusion
Different department levels within a corporation provide valuable information needed to
properly quantify a facility's consequence of failure (CoF). This CoF metric can be used to
ensure organizations are funding the most critical projects to support their overall
objectives (Savatgy et al. 2019). The fuzzy logic-based architecture proposed here is an
extension of DePalmer et al.'s framework and case study of the U.S. Air Force's Mission
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Dependency Index (MDI) metric (DePalmer et al. 2021). This research is intended to
improve the previous project prioritization methodology and aid with risk-based decision
support. The inter-Dependency values added to the methodology create openings for the
CoF score to change as risk information is aggregated from senior-level departments. These
additions eliminate the need for the Air Force's subjective priority point ranking as part of
the CoF metric while simultaneously improving the project prioritization methodology to
be more accurate and less biased.

Cognitive biases, individual decision styles, and risk attitude can all plague technologyoriented methodologies used for decision support (Phillips-Wren et al. 2019; Power et al.
2019; Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1992). These individual influences can cause users to
choose sub-optimal decisions, which lead to wasted resources or unnecessary facility
failure of vulnerable, unfunded projects. The previous methodology was improved by
considering these individual biases and determining the possible effects personal risk
attitude can have on desired results. These results established acceptable risk thresholds
that can identify increased education needs, flag extreme responses, or identify portfolio
groups with unbalanced risk profiles.

Portfolio managers and campus leaders need to ensure limited resources are allocated
appropriately to campus construction and sustainment projects. Decision-makers need to
understand how a facility plays a role in an organization's objectives at all department
levels while maximizing the value of information collected and minimizing the time,
resources, and complexity required to compare and prioritize projects. The tactical,
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operational, and strategic MDI metric produced by this system is simple and repeatable
and can be used for applications other than project prioritization like balancing the overall
risk profile of a location. Decision support tools need to consider how personal biases and
attitudes can affect the responses, and quality control specialists must create simple
methods to quickly vet responses. This novel framework integrates senior-level department
knowledge with a previously created risk assessment methodology to produce a facility
prioritization method that meets the needs of decision-makers, portfolio managers, and
campus leadership.

91

IV. Conclusions and Recommendations
Assumptions/Limitations
Fuzzy logic enables computing with words, and this methodology creates an algorithm that
converts linguistic variables into realistic results with imprecise data and expert's logical
inferences (Lee 1990; Zadeh 1999). Therefore, the FIS results are heavily dependent on the
expert opinions used to calibrate the FIS. There is an assumption that the system, as
parameterized in this thesis, is built to the organization's satisfaction (Nelson 2019).
Although the authors designed the membership functions and risk levels of this framework
with realism in mind, AFIMSC must determine the tactical, operational, and strategic level
inputs needed to determine the MDI. An MDI focus group of stakeholders with various
facility management, risk, and tactical, operational, or strategic mission experience can
quickly validate assumptions and determine requirements for the system.
Table 8 shows the steps needed to replace the assumptions made for this framework.
Table 8. Table of Assumptions
Framework Step
Establish membership
functions for inputs

Assumption
Input Variables
Input Membership
Functions

Establish membership
functions for outputs

Output Variables
Output Membership
Functions

Establish rules for the
fuzzy system

Rules

AFIMSC Determines
Linguistic Variable
Linguistic Terms
Universe of Discourse
Fuzzy Set Range
Function Shape
Linguistic Variable
Linguistic Terms
Universe of Discourse
Fuzzy Set Range
Function Shape
Inference Type
Expert Rules
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Defuzzification Method
Evaluate outputs
graphically

Validate Fuzzy Risk
Surface
Validate Response

System Surface Accurately
Represents MDI
Responses Fit Required Need
-True Responses/Data
or Expected
Distribution of
Responses

AFIMSC provided survey results from the four-by-four TMDI matrix (Figure 1); however,
the actual crisp inputs used in the FIS are unknown, and chosen distributions were assumed
to simulate risk attitude. In Chapter 2, a neutral risk attitude was assumed for the subjective
inputs Interruptability and Replicability. These responses were varied in Chapter 3 using
triangular distributions to show how different risk attitudes can affect system outputs.
These assumptions could be limiting if the true responses do not match the simulated
responses used to validate the outputs and build the system. Actual survey responses would
be used as crisp inputs to and change the results of this research. AFIMSC's focus group
can use these simulated responses or risk attitude distributions to test the system and ensure
the outputs align with their objectives or identify unacceptable thresholds for their process.

An additional limitation identified by this research is the need to protect SMDI and OMDI
data for national security reasons. Directly linking specific assets to an operational or
strategic priority may provide an adversary a list of critical nodes. This threat can incur
additional costs from the added security needed to protect data and clear access to vetted
individuals for use. A classified military information status may limit the MDI metric's
wide-spread application and useability (AFIMSC 2020).
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Conclusions of Research
This research investigated the new tactical MDI re-baselining effort by AFIMSC and the
opportunities for improvement by applying fuzzy logic. Three investigation questions were
studied in this research:

Investigative Question 1: Is fuzzy logic an appropriate methodology for calculating
MDI?
Although the Air Force's current process to quantify the MDI is valid, it can be improved
to reduce the imprecision, uncertainty, and bias by integrating the existing traditional risk
matrix with a modernized fuzzy inference system. Fuzzy logic can combine the MDI's
descriptive linguistic terms and imprecise data with the Air Force's value and respect for
expert knowledge to create tangible results. A fuzzy system can capture the uncertainty
between the risk matrix categories and can be customized to fit the user's needs. The
products of a fuzzy inference system can be used for prioritization and risk assessments,
with the opportunity to expand the system boundaries and include new inputs for
computing operational and strategic level MDI. Assessing the viability of using fuzzy logic
for risk assessment was further investigated in Chapter 2. The literature review in Chapter
2 revealed fuzzy logic as an appropriate methodology to integrate with risk assessments,
prioritization methodologies, and risk matrices because of their imprecise nature and use
of linguistic variables for better understanding of results. Fuzzy logic has also been
explicitly applied to military operational risk planning (Nelson 2019). The benefits of using
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fuzzy logic include the system's customizability to reflect the Air Force's needs and
flexibility to changing operational priorities without additional complexities for decisionmakers.

Investigative Question 2: What is an appropriate framework for a Fuzzy Inference
System (FIS) that could enable assessments of mission risk?
The fuzzy tactical MDI framework was built with AFIMSC's original MDI re-baselining
matrix as the foundation to determine the rules, variables, and membership functions, as
seen in Chapter 2. The original four-by-four matrix was expanded to increase the range of
possible MDI scores and eliminate the need for re-scoring assets below 40. Dependency
was added as an input variable to show the ease of flexibility and add dimensionality to the
system. Initial MDI survey results were normally distributed to capture the uncertainty
between categories and produce realistic results for system validation. The different risk
surfaces can be compared in Figure 18, which shows the additional resolution able to be
achieved when using a fuzzy inference system rather than a traditional risk matrix.
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Figure 18. a (left) AFIMSC's TMDI risk matrix surface as compared to b (right) the
proposed fuzzy TMDI surface at Dependency = 0.5
In Chapter 3, the authors expanded the MDI metric beyond the original matrix to explore
the opportunities to quantify MDI at the operational and strategic levels. This framework
produced a series of FISs that used Interruptability, Replicability, and Dependency to
output TMDI, OMDI, and SMDI scores. Although Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 propose a
framework that assesses a facility's failure risk to mission, the framework must be
calibrated by AFIMSC to produce realistic results. Calibration requirements can be seen in
Table 8 and should be determined by Air Force facility management, risk, and mission
experts. The calibrated system requirements should be included in future research on this
topic.
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Investigative Question 3: How can fuzzy logic be used to expand MDI to enable
participation by stakeholders from all levels of the organizational hierarchy, e.g.,
operational and strategic level?
Chapter 3 investigates the opportunity to expand the MDI to include operational and
strategic level influence. The research suggests that fuzzy logic is a methodology that is
capable of adding assessment criteria without increasing the complexity of understanding
the results to decision-makers. This research illustrates this by increasing the informational
depth at the tactical level with Inter-Dependency in Chapter 2 and increasing the breadth
with Intra-Dependency information at the strategic and operational level in Chapter 3.
These additional variables were quickly incorporated into the system, expanding MDI's
dimensionality without complicating the results for decision-makers. The framework in
Chapter 3 includes operational and strategic knowledge to produce OMDI and SMDI
results. Still, these variables could all be independent input variables for a single system
merging tactical, operational, and strategic facility data to produce one MDI metric. The
authors did not research this single-output-architecture due to stakeholder requests for
individual MDI scores at each hierarchy level. The ability to include additional meaningful
information without further taxation of decision-maker resources is vital to keep the
process simple and repeatable across the entire Air Force or similarly motivated
organizations. A significant limitation to the operational and strategic expansion in the Air
Force is the need to protect the operational and strategic level data from adversaries.
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Significance of Research
Air Force operational risk managers need a reliable methodology to accurately assess the
consequence of a facility's failure to strategic objectives and ensure resources are
prioritized for the highest-risk projects. The procedure should be a simple and repeatable
process that takes into account tactical, operational, and strategic level knowledge about
the facility and the mission it enables. The process needs to be resilient to human decisionmaking biases and risk attitude as well as MDI inflation. This research provides a novel
framework for using fuzzy logic to assess risk and quantify the relationship between a
facility and the enabled functions.

Unlike traditional risk matrices, fuzzy logic can capture the uncertainties between
categorical input classes and use them to determine a low-cost, robust solution. Without
capturing uncertainty between categories, the traditional risk matrix produces risk ties that
do not provide the resolution needed to distinguish between facilities when decisionmaking differences exist. For example, if two facilities have a Replicability of "Extremely
Difficult", but Facility A has an Interruptability requirement of a 30-minute response, and
Facility B needs just under a 24-hour response, both facilities fall within the "Brief"
category. The risk matrix (Figure 1) would give both of these facilities an MDI of 80 when
clearly, Facility A requires a more critical response than Facility B. Although this example
is highly simplified, the complexity is increased if a decision-maker is forced to choose
between many facilities with the same risk score. This process becomes even more difficult
or impossible without the tactical-level knowledge needed to differentiate multiple
facilities.
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This framework can be implemented into Air Force asset management practices as a
technical backbone for a prioritization methodology or a decision support system. Because
the MDI is part of AFIMSC's technical project score, risk score ties can cause zones of
uncertainty when it comes to project authorization. By using a fuzzy logic system, these
risk ties can be reduced, and the remaining risk ties can be assumed to have an equal
consequence to the mission. Reducing risk ties and capturing uncertainty allows the
organization to use the methodology to create meaningful prioritizations with ordinal
results. This system can be built using MathWork's Fuzzy Logic Toolbox (MathWorks, Inc
2021) and fed crisp inputs employing data collection from existing Real Property databases
or mission owner survey responses.

The additional information from the senior-leadership levels and the capture of uncertainty
within the categories can allow the Air Force to eliminate the use of CATCODE-based
MDI scores. This update ensures there is no need for an adjudication process due to
mismatched CATCODE-to-MDI scores. The MDI accurately reflects the facility's
consequence to the mission at all levels, based on the function rather than the facility type.
This can also be useful when a location's objectives are changed, such as when a new
mission is beddown at a base or an old mission is relocated. Previously, these changes
would require Base Civil Engineers to re-prioritize their facility type codes to align with
the base's new objectives and re-distribute scores for facilities categorized as "Prolonged"
Interruptability and "Possible" Replicability. By eliminating the use of CATCODEs within
the system, the Air Force can eliminate this need for large-scale re-prioritization.
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The value of an MDI score goes beyond a centralized project prioritization for large scale
portfolio management. This metric can be used by organization leadership to determine the
best use of their resources in many different situations. For example, base defense experts
can use MDI to determine which facilities need additional hardening and threat protection.
Civil Engineers and communication technicians can use MDI to decide which facilities
require redundant systems (such as generators or servers) and in what order to distribute
these resources. Tactical leadership can use MDI to authorize or advocate for decentralized
funding to sustain, repair, or modernize facilities.

Recommendations for Future Research
Primarily, this research was limited by the availability of expert knowledge about the true
MDI membership functions and translating linguistic rules. The resulting framework can
be calibrated to fit the Air Force's needs after future research determines the real
membership function class, range, and shape of all input and output variables. Additionally,
the linguistic rules that translate these inputs to outputs must be attuned to fit the
organization's desired results. Once the system is calibrated, products can be created to
update a variable’s information in the system easily. Crisp inputs can be collected by a
graphical user interface (GUI) with tools like a slider bar for subjective values or direct
database links to Real Property Inventory Data values, as seen in Figure 19. This interface
can be customized to fit the organization's needs and reduce the influence from human
decision-making biases or risk attitudes with personalizations such as hiding the final MDI
score or junior level Dependency values at higher organizational echelons.
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Figure 19. Example graphical user interface to collect crisp inputs for the Fuzzy MDI
methodology.

Secondly, additional research is needed for different organizational hierarchy frameworks.
The proposed method of a three-tiered organization will not work in all instances. Other
hierarchical structures with multiple management levels or shared assets will require
additional future research.

Finally, the Air Force should expand the TMDI metric beyond facilities to other
infrastructure types such as roads and utilities. These additional infrastructure assets are
essential to mission success, and facilities are highly dependent on their operations. Future
researchers should determine if Interruptability, Replicability, and Dependency are still
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appropriate variables for quantifying the MDI of infrastructure. With these future research
topics, the Air Force can expand the MDI metric to support better risk-based decisionmaking and asset management practices.
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Appendix A. MATLAB Fuzzy Inference System Code
[System]
Name='TMDI'
Type='mamdani'
Version=2.0
NumInputs=3
NumOutputs=1
NumRules=75
AndMethod='min'
OrMethod='max'
ImpMethod='min'
AggMethod='max'
DefuzzMethod='centroid'
[Input1]
Name='Interruptability'
Range=[0 6]
NumMFs=5
MF1='No_Impact':'trapmf',[-1 0 1 2]
MF2='Prolonged':'trimf',[1 2 3]
MF3='Short':'trimf',[2 3 4]
MF4='Brief':'trimf',[3 4 5]
MF5='Immediate':'trapmf',[4 5 6 7]
[Input2]
Name='Replicability'
Range=[0 6]
NumMFs=5
MF1='Available':'trapmf',[-1 0 1 2]
MF2='Possible':'trimf',[1 2 3]
MF3='Difficult':'trimf',[2 3 4]
MF4='Ex._Difficult':'trimf',[3 4 5]
MF5='Impossible':'trapmf',[4 5 6 7]
[Input3]
Name='Dependency'
Range=[0 1]
NumMFs=3
MF1='Low':'trapmf',[-0.3 0 0.2 0.4]
MF2='Medium':'trapmf',[0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8]
MF3='High':'trapmf',[0.6 0.8 1 1.3]
[Output1]
Name='TMDI'
Range=[-25 125]
NumMFs=5
MF1='Very_Low':'trimf',[-25 0 25]
MF2='Low':'trimf',[0 25 50]
MF3='Medium':'trimf',[25 50 75]
MF4='High':'trimf',[50 75 100]
MF5='Very_High':'trimf',[75 100 125]
[Rules]
1 1 2, 1 (1) : 1
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[System]
Name='OMDI'
Type='mamdani'
Version=2.0
NumInputs=2
NumOutputs=1
NumRules=15
AndMethod='min'
OrMethod='max'
ImpMethod='min'
AggMethod='max'
DefuzzMethod='centroid'
[Input1]
Name='TMDI'
Range=[0 100]
NumMFs=5
MF1='Very_Low':'trimf',[-25 0 25]
MF2='Low':'trimf',[0 25 50]
MF3='Medium':'trimf',[25 50 75]
MF4='High':'trimf',[50 75 100]
MF5='Very_High':'trimf',[75 100 125]
[Input2]
Name='Dependency'
Range=[0 1]
NumMFs=3
MF1='Low':'trapmf',[-0.1 0 0.2 0.4]
MF2='Medium':'trapmf',[0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8]
MF3='High':'trapmf',[0.6 0.8 1 1.2]
[Output1]
Name='OMDI'
Range=[-25 125]
NumMFs=5
MF1='Very_Low':'trimf',[-25 0 25]
MF2='Low':'trimf',[0 25 50]
MF3='Medium':'trimf',[25 50 75]
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MF4='High':'trimf',[50 75 100]
MF5='Very_High':'trimf',[75 100 125]
[Rules]
1 1, 1 (1)
2 1, 1 (1)
3 1, 2 (1)
4 1, 3 (1)
5 1, 4 (1)
1 2, 1 (1)
2 2, 2 (1)
3 2, 3 (1)
4 2, 4 (1)
5 2, 5 (1)
1 3, 2 (1)
2 3, 3 (1)
3 3, 4 (1)
4 3, 5 (1)
5 3, 5 (1)

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
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:
:
:
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1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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1

[System]
Name='SMDI'
Type='mamdani'
Version=2.0
NumInputs=2
NumOutputs=1
NumRules=15
AndMethod='min'
OrMethod='max'
ImpMethod='min'
AggMethod='max'
DefuzzMethod='centroid'
[Input1]
Name='OMDI'
Range=[0 100]
NumMFs=5
MF1='Very_Low':'trimf',[-25 0 25]
MF2='Low':'trimf',[0 25 50]
MF3='Medium':'trimf',[25 50 75]
MF4='High':'trimf',[50 75 100]
MF5='Very_High':'trimf',[75 100 125]
[Input2]
Name='Dependency'
Range=[0 1]
NumMFs=3
MF1='Low':'trapmf',[-0.1 0 0.2 0.4]
MF2='Medium':'trapmf',[0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8]
MF3='High':'trapmf',[0.6 0.8 1 1.2]
[Output1]
Name='SMDI'
Range=[-25 125]
NumMFs=5
MF1='Very_Low':'trimf',[-25 0 25]
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MF2='Low':'trimf',[0 25 50]
MF3='Medium':'trimf',[25 50 75]
MF4='High':'trimf',[50 75 100]
MF5='Very_High':'trimf',[75 100 125]
[Rules]
1 1, 1 (1)
2 1, 2 (1)
3 1, 3 (1)
4 1, 3 (1)
5 1, 4 (1)
1 2, 2 (1)
2 2, 3 (1)
3 2, 3 (1)
4 2, 4 (1)
5 2, 4 (1)
1 3, 3 (1)
2 3, 4 (1)
3 3, 4 (1)
4 3, 5 (1)
5 3, 5 (1)

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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